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Note 
Cryptocurrency and the SEC: How a Piecemeal 
Approach to Regulating New Technology Selectively 
Stifles Innovation 
ADAM J. KUEGLER 
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) recently took steps to regulate 
certain forms of cryptocurrency as substitute securities. However, the SEC has not 
provided clear guidance regarding which forms of cryptocurrency it deems worthy 
of regulation. This creates a dilemma. While some cryptocurrencies, like those 
involved in capital-raising via initial coin offerings (ICOs), do indeed seem like 
securities, others do not. For example, J.P. Morgan is developing a cryptocurrency 
that appears to be more like fiat currency than a security. This Note discusses how 
the SEC recently convinced a federal judge that certain ICO-related 
cryptocurrencies can be considered securities under the Howey test, as well as how 
the major questions doctrine—which asserts that issues of major importance should 
not be left to the discretion of federal agencies absent clear congressional 
guidance—relates to the topic of cryptocurrency regulation. Furthermore, this Note 
discusses why it is undesirable that the SEC is regulating cryptocurrency without 
clear guidance from Congress regarding which cryptocurrencies the Commission 
has the authority to regulate. Because cryptocurrency is such a rapidly developing 
field, the gray area between forms of cryptocurrency that seem to be securities and 
those that do not will only become more complex. As a result, piecemeal 
cryptocurrency regulation will continue to deprive innovators of sufficient guidance 
regarding issues such as whether their cryptocurrency must be registered with the 
SEC. Ultimately, this Note argues that the regulation of cryptocurrency—as a 
developing technology—is a “major question,” and thus Congress should authorize 
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Cryptocurrency and the SEC: How a Piecemeal 
Approach to Regulating New Technology Selectively 
Stifles Innovation 
ADAM J. KUEGLER * 
INTRODUCTION 
In recent months, the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC” 
or the “Commission”) has inserted itself into cryptocurrency regulation in 
various ways. First, the SEC fined three individuals involved in managing a 
hedge fund that falsely advertised the fund as the first regulated firm of its 
kind to focus on cryptocurrency.1 Second, the Commission fined a 
cryptocurrency firm for not registering as a brokerage firm.2 Finally, in the 
same month, a federal judge ruled for the first time that initial coin offerings 
(ICOs) could be the subject of securities laws.3 Yet, the lines that the SEC 
                                                                                                                     
* J.D. 2020, University of Connecticut School of Law; B.A. 2017, University of Connecticut, Storrs. 
Special thanks to Professor Kiel Brennan-Marquez for his outstanding advising throughout the process 
of writing this Note, and to Professor Jennifer Taub for her review and comments from a securities law 
perspective. Thanks also to the superb staff of the Connecticut Law Review for reviewing and editing this 
Note. Finally, a sincere thank you to my family, friends, and loved ones, especially my parents and my 
brother, Zachary, for their support throughout my law school endeavors. 
1 Dave Michaels, SEC Takes First Action Against Hedge Fund Over Cryptocurrency Investments, 
WALL ST. J. (Sept. 11, 2018, 3:48 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-takes-first-action-against-
hedge-fund-over-cryptocurrency-investments-1536688661. The Commission charged the hedge fund 
with violations of sections 5(a), 5(c), and 17(a)(2) of the Securities Act, section 7(a) of the Investment 
Company Act, and section 206(4) of the Advisers Act, along with corresponding Rule 206(4)-8. Crypto 
Asset Mgmt., LP, Securities Act Release No. 10544 (Sept. 11, 2018), 
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2018/33-10544.pdf. Section 5(a) prohibits the sale of unregistered 
securities through interstate commerce or the mail. 15 U.S.C. § 77e(a) (2012). Section 5(c) prohibits 
offering to sell unregistered securities through interstate commerce or the mail. § 77e(c). Section 17(a)(2) 
prohibits “any person in the offer or sale of any securities” from “obtain[ing] money or property by means 
of any untrue statement of a material fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to 
make the statements made . . . not misleading.” § 77q(a)(2). Section 7(a) prohibits investment companies 
that are not registered with the SEC from “engag[ing] in any business in interstate commerce.” § 80-7(a). 
Finally, Rule 206(4)-8 prohibits untrue statements or omissions of material facts by investment advisers 
“to any investor or prospective investor in [a] pooled investment vehicle.” 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-8 
(2019). The SEC fined the hedge fund $200,000. Crypto Asset Mgmt., LP, Securities Act Release No. 
10544, supra, at 5. 
2 Michaels, supra note 1. 
3 Alexander Osipovich, Judge Lets Cryptocurrency Fraud Case Go Forward, In Win for SEC, 
WALL ST. J. (Sept. 11, 2018, 6:34 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/judge-lets-cryptocurrency-fraud-
case-go-forward-in-win-for-sec-1536704792. An ICO occurs when “a firm creates a new cryptocurrency 
and sells it to investors to raise money.” Id. The federal judge did not go so far as to resolve the question 
of whether the cryptocurrencies in that case were securities, as his ruling “only settled the question of 
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and the federal judge have set are far from bright. As a reporter for the Wall 
Street Journal noted, “[t]he SEC didn’t reveal which tokens or 
cryptocurrencies were implicated [in two of the cases discussed above], 
making it impossible to tell which digital coins the regulator considers to be 
securities.”4 One of the firms penalized by the SEC cited this uncertainty as 
the reason for closing its doors, stating that its shutdown was “due to the 
ever changing regulatory landscape of cryptocurrency space in our 
jurisdiction.”5 
Cryptocurrency and ICOs represent an unresolved area of federal 
regulation. ICOs are devices for raising capital.6 Put simply, when a firm 
carries out an ICO, it “creates a new cryptocurrency and sells it to investors 
to raise money.”7 ICOs differ from traditional initial public offerings (IPOs) 
in that the purchaser in an ICO does not receive equity in a company.8 
                                                                                                                     
whether [the] case would go to trial.” Id. Rather, the judge found that “the Indictment alleges sufficient 
facts that, if proven at trial, could lead a reasonable jury to find that [the cryptocurrencies] constituted 
‘investment contracts.’” Memorandum & Order at *10, United States v. Zaslavskiy, No. 17 CR 647 
(RJD), 2018 WL 4346339 (E.D.N.Y. 2018), ECF No. 37 (slip copy) [hereinafter Zaslavaskiy 
Memorandum & Order]. 
4 Michaels, supra note 1; see also Jay Clayton, Statement on Cryptocurrencies and Initial Coin 
Offerings, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMM’N (Dec. 11, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/news/public-
statement/statement-clayton-2017-12-11#_ftnref6 (“It has been asserted that cryptocurrencies are not 
securities and that the offer and sale of cryptocurrencies are beyond the SEC’s jurisdiction. Whether that 
assertion proves correct with respect to any digital asset that is labeled as a cryptocurrency will depend 
on the characteristics and use of that particular asset.”). More recently, the SEC has offered additional 
guidance regarding how cryptocurrencies may be classified as securities. See Framework for “Investment 
Contract” Analysis of Digital Assets, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMM’N, 
https://www.sec.gov/corpfin/framework-investment-contract-analysis-digital-assets (last updated Apr. 
3, 2019) (providing “a framework for analyzing whether a digital asset has the characteristics of one 
particular type of security–an ‘investment contract’”). However, while this guidance is instructive, it still 
leaves uncertainty. The SEC cautions: 
These factors are not intended to be exhaustive in evaluating whether a digital asset is 
an investment contract or any other type of security, and no single factor is 
determinative; rather, we are providing them to assist those engaging in the offer, sale, 
or distribution of a digital asset, and their counsel, as they consider these issues. We 
encourage market participants to seek the advice of securities counsel and engage with 
the Staff through www.sec.gov/finhub. 
Id. 
5 Michaels, supra note 1. 
6 Zachary Missan, Note, The SEC and Initial Coin Offerings: How Securities Laws Affect ICOs, 37 
B.U. REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 85, 85 (2017); Osipovich, supra note 3. 
7 Osipovich, supra note 3. For further background on ICOs, see Arjun Kharpal, Tokenization: The 
World of ICOs, CNBC (July 16, 2018, 2:09 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/07/13/initial-coin-
offering-ico-what-are-they-how-do-they-work.html; Joon Ian Wong, Ethereum Unleashed the “Initial 
Coin Offering” Craze, But It Can’t Handle Its Insane Success, QUARTZ (June 15, 2017), 
https://qz.com/1004892/the-bancor-ico-just-raised-153-million-on-ethereum-in-three-hours/. See also 
ICOs Explained: 5 Examples of Successful Coin Offerings, MEDIUM (Apr. 23, 2018), 
https://medium.com/boosto/icos-explained-5-examples-of-successful-coin-offerings-2ddcb780ef58 
(providing examples of other ICOs). 
8 Kharpal, supra note 7. 
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Rather, the purchaser hopes: (a) to be able to use the cryptocurrency on a 
product to be created in the future, and/or (b) that the value of the coin itself 
will increase so that the investor can profit by trading it.9 In 2017, initial coin 
offerings became extremely popular because firms saw them as a method of 
bypassing the regulatory and fee structure associated with initial public 
offerings.10 
The SEC, however, remains “wary” of ICOs.11 In reference to ICOs, the 
Commission issued a report in July 2017 “in order to stress that the U.S. 
federal securities law may apply to various activities, including distributed 
ledger technology, depending on the particular facts and circumstances, 
without regard to the form of the organization or technology used to 
effectuate a particular offer or sale.”12 Still, from January through June 
2018—months after the SEC issued the report—firms raised approximately 
$12 billion through ICOs.13 Following the SEC’s July 2017 Report, some 
cryptocurrency companies have attempted to offer cryptocurrencies in 
compliance with the registration requirements of section 5 of the Securities 
Act or its exemptions. For example, one company—Filecoin—raised more 
than $257 million through an offering under Rule 506(c) of Regulation D, 
which allows general solicitation for offerings that involve sales exclusively 
to accredited investors.14 
Cryptocurrency regulation is largely uncharted legal territory. The first 
time a federal judge ruled that ICOs could be the subject of SEC regulation 
was in September 2018 in the case of United States v. Zaslavskiy.15 Notably, 
a court in another federal district has already cited Zaslavskiy in finding that 
a plaintiff had a private cause of action against a corporation that had not 
registered its cryptocurrency as a security.16 As Zaslavskiy and other similar 
cases gain traction and rise through the federal court system, the SEC’s 
toughest test in cryptocurrency regulation—a legal battle before the 
Supreme Court—could be in the making. 
                                                                                                                     
9 Id. 
10 Osipovich, supra note 3. 
11 Id. 
12 See Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: 
The DAO, Exchange Act Release No. 81207, at 10 (July 25, 2017), 
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/investreport/34-81207.pdf [hereinafter July 2017 SEC Report of 
Investigation]. 
13 Osipovich, supra note 3. 
14 Michael Mendelson, From Initial Coin Offerings to Security Tokens: A U.S. Federal Securities 
Law Analysis, 22 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 52, 85 (2019) (citing 17 C.F.R. § 230.144 (2018) and 17 C.F.R. 
§ 230.905 (2018)). 
15 See Zaslavskiy Memorandum & Order, supra note 3, at *10 (ruling that a jury could find that the 
cryptocurrencies in this case were “investment contracts”); Osipovich, supra note 3 (“Regulators scored 
a victory in their crackdown on cryptocurrency crimes as a judge ruled that initial coin offerings are 
subject to U.S. securities-fraud laws.”). 
16 Solis v. Latium Network, Inc., No. 18-10255 (SDW) (SCM), 2018 WL 6445543, at *4–6 (D.N.J. 
Dec. 10, 2018). 
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As a subject of federal regulation, cryptocurrency provides an important 
opportunity for analysis and reflection. Its current value stems from the fact 
that it is so new that the Federal Government has not completely solidified 
its regulatory approach.17 Meanwhile, the Supreme Court might decide to 
drastically change the Chevron doctrine18 and restrict the power of federal 
agencies to act without express statutory authority. This possibility became 
especially plausible with the confirmation of Justice Brett Kavanaugh to the 
Supreme Court in 2018, replacing Justice Anthony Kennedy.19 Justice 
Kennedy frequently served as the swing vote in administrative law cases.20 
Justice Kavanaugh, who has criticized the Chevron doctrine,21 may push the 
Court towards ending the Chevron doctrine as we know it. This could 
severely curtail the SEC’s power to regulate cryptocurrency absent clear 
congressional authorization to do so. 
This Note does not take a position on the broad question of whether the 
Supreme Court should fundamentally transform Chevron. Rather, this Note 
argues more narrowly that there are legitimate and persuasive doctrinal and 
policy reasons for why the SEC should not be involved in regulating 
cryptocurrency at this time. This reasoning is based on three main premises. 
First, cryptocurrency is an everchanging subject that will likely continue to 
evolve into myriad uses as it rapidly becomes a major part of the U.S. 
economy. Thus, cryptocurrency regulation falls within the major questions 
doctrine, which directs that “agencies need clear authorization from 
Congress to pass regulations with major economic and political 
significance.”22 The doctrine further advises courts against deferring to “an 
agency’s interpretation of a statutory provision . . . where the interpretive 
                                                                                                                     
17 Osipovich, supra note 3 (describing how the SEC “has said many ICOs are unregistered securities 
offerings, making them potentially illegal, and warned that many could be fraudulent” (emphasis added)). 
18 See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–44 (1984) (setting 
out the process by which courts should analyze statutory interpretations by federal agencies). 
19 Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Kavanaugh Is Sworn In After Close Confirmation Vote in Senate, N.Y. 
TIMES (Oct. 6, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/06/us/politics/brett-kavanaugh-supreme-
court.html. 
20 ANDREW NOLAN & CAITLAIN DEVEREAUX LEWIS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45293, JUDGE 
BRETT M. KAVANAUGH: HIS JURISPRUDENCE AND POTENTIAL IMPACT ON THE SUPREME COURT 44 
(2018) [hereinafter CRS KAVANAUGH REPORT]. 
21 Brett M. Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpretation, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2118, 2151 (2016) 
[hereinafter Fixing Statutory Interpretation] (arguing that the Chevron doctrine allows a deviation from 
the best reading of a statute). 
22 CRS KAVANAUGH REPORT, supra note 20, at 51. For scholarly literature defining the major 
questions doctrine in terms of economic and political significance, see, for example, Blake Emerson, 
Administrative Answers to Major Questions: On the Democratic Legitimacy of Agency Statutory 
Interpretation, 102 MINN. L. REV. 2019, 2022 (2018); Kevin O. Leske, Major Questions About the 
“Major Questions” Doctrine, 5 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 479, 479 (2016); Nathan Richardson, 
Keeping Big Cases from Making Bad Law: The Resurgent “Major Questions” Doctrine, 49 CONN. L. 
REV. 355, 358 (2016); Marla D. Tortorice, Nondelegation and the Major Questions Doctrine: Displacing 
Interpretive Power, 67 BUFF. L. REV. 1075, 1102–03 (2019). 
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question could effectuate an enormous and transformative expansion of the 
agency’s regulatory authority.”23 The second premise relates to policy 
considerations. Due to the rapid evolution of cryptocurrency, cryptocurrency 
regulation requires a comprehensive approach. To allow one federal agency, 
such as the SEC, to regulate one aspect of cryptocurrency allows for a 
piecemeal approach that may lead to obscure results and stifle innovation. 
The third and final premise relates to distributive justice. Put simply, smaller 
cryptocurrency companies will be disproportionately affected by regulatory 
uncertainty. 
Cryptocurrency regulation is a complex issue. It requires balancing the 
hardships and barriers to entry that uncertain regulation creates, on the one 
hand, with adequately addressing the need to protect cryptocurrency 
consumers and investors, on the other. While the observation that smaller 
companies find it more difficult to comply with regulations than larger 
companies is generally true—that is, it is not a dynamic unique to 
cryptocurrency—this Note’s argument is more specific. Namely, regulatory 
uncertainty is especially detrimental to young industries that rely on 
emerging, rapidly developing technologies, because these industries are 
more susceptible than mature industries to the possibility that smaller 
companies will be left behind by regulatory uncertainty. In other words, this 
Note does not focus on how general costs of compliance disproportionately 
affect smaller companies. Rather, it argues that smaller companies will be 
left behind because they will not know whether they have to comply with 
specific regulations—or even which agencies are responsible for regulating 
them. Technologies like cryptocurrency, being both new and poorly 
understood, run the risk of creating a piecemeal regulatory system that is 
incapable of keeping up with innovation. This only leads to more uncertainty 
and, subsequently, more inequality. 
Ultimately, this Note argues that Congress should authorize a new 
federal commission or a sub-agency within a federal agency—perhaps even 
the SEC—to deal exclusively with cryptocurrency. This, of course, is a bold 
proposal. However, cryptocurrency is not only a topic of major consequence, 
but it also spans many areas of the technological and financial landscape. 
ICOs have the potential to revolutionize investing practices. In fact, they are 
already having a major effect.24 Meanwhile, cryptocurrency could 
drastically change the ways in which corporations and banks move money 
                                                                                                                     
23 Leske, supra note 22, at 480. See also Richardson, supra note 22, at 358 (noting that the major 
questions doctrine “claws back interpretive authority for judges in certain ‘extraordinary’ cases” and that 
“it says that when the legal stakes are sufficiently high, agency interpretations of law carry little or no 
weight, contrary to the standard rule in everyday cases where those interpretations are often 
determinative” (citation omitted)). 
24 See Osipovich, supra note 3 (noting that entities used ICOs to raise $12 billion in the first half of 
2018). 
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around the world.25 The diversity in the ways in which cryptocurrency can 
be used results in complex legal and regulatory issues. Through a single 
regulatory agency or sub-agency that deals exclusively with cryptocurrency, 
the Federal Government can be prepared to deal with new cryptocurrency 
devices as they arise. In addition, by adopting a unified channel for 
regulation, the Federal Government can facilitate innovation, which is 
extremely important to the financial sector and other industries.  
Importantly, this Note does not argue that it is completely nonsensical 
for certain federal agencies, including the SEC, to assert jurisdiction over 
certain aspects of cryptocurrency. Nor does this Note necessarily argue for 
more cryptocurrency regulation or less cryptocurrency regulation. Rather, 
this Note argues for smarter cryptocurrency regulation. It is understandable 
that some federal agencies see aspects of cryptocurrency as falling within 
their jurisdiction. It follows that the proper place for cryptocurrency 
regulation might be a sub-agency within an existing federal agency, such as 
the Federal Trade Commission. But development in cryptocurrency is 
creating gray areas—areas within the field that do not neatly fit within the 
jurisdiction of any single, currently-existing federal agency. As this Note 
discusses, when one or multiple ill-suited agencies attempt to deal with a 
rapidly changing innovative technology, the result is inefficiency—and 
uncertainty—in regulation. This uncertainty can be cured, at least in part, by 
the congressional authorization of a single regulator—a “one stop shop” for 
cryptocurrency innovators—to determine the appropriate methods of 
cryptocurrency regulation as the field develops.  
This Note introduces the problem, in Part I, through a careful analysis 
of United States v. Zaslavskiy, a 2018 case holding that cryptocurrency could 
be the subject of federal securities regulation. Next, Part II focuses on the 
Chevron doctrine, the major questions doctrine, and why these doctrines 
could matter to an eventual U.S. Supreme Court decision addressing 
cryptocurrency regulation. Part III discusses why an agency or sub-agency 
focused exclusively on cryptocurrency would be preferable to piecemeal 
regulation involving the SEC and other federal agencies. Finally, the Note 
ends with some concluding thoughts. 
I. SECURITIES REGULATION, SECURITIES CASE LAW, AND THEIR 
RELATIONSHIP TO CRYPTOCURRENCY: THE ZASLAVSKIY CASE 
A review of recent cryptocurrency case law, foundational securities 
cases, and SEC regulations provides insight into how the Commission is 
asserting itself into cryptocurrency regulation and how courts are reacting. 
                                                                                                                     
25 See J.P. Morgan Creates Digital Coin for Payments, J.P. MORGAN (Feb. 14, 2019), 
https://www.jpmorgan.com/global/news/digital-coin-payments [hereinafter J.P. Morgan JPM Coin 
Announcement] (describing J.P. Morgan’s creation of its own cryptocurrency, “JPM Coin”). 
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Judge Raymond J. Dearie’s recent memorandum and order in United States 
v. Zaslavskiy26 is a natural starting point. It both exemplifies the SEC’s 
position on cryptocurrency and provides a review of relevant securities cases 
from SEC v. W.J. Howey Co.27 through the present day.28  
In Zaslavskiy, the defendant allegedly collected money from investors 
under the false premise that his cryptocurrencies, “REcoin” and “Diamond,” 
were backed by real estate and diamonds, respectively.29 He promised that 
those who invested in REcoin “could change their money into a ‘more stable 
and secure investment: real estate,’ which ‘grows in value.’”30 He also stated 
that the proceeds of REcoin were “invest[ed] . . . into global real estate.”31 
As for Diamond, the defendant falsely claimed that the cryptocurrency was 
hedged by actual diamonds and that through Diamond’s efforts, the 
cryptocurrency could be excepted to grow by at least ten or fifteen percent 
each year.32 
The Government charged Zaslavskiy with securities fraud under the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act) and SEC Rule 10b-5.33 
The Government argued that investments in the cryptocurrencies that the 
defendant peddled were “investment contracts” within the definitions for 
securities in the Exchange Act and the Securities Act of 1933 (Securities 
Act).34 The defendant moved to dismiss the charges against him based in 
part on the argument that his cryptocurrencies did not qualify as securities.35 
Zaslavskiy claimed that his supposed cryptocurrencies were currency rather 
than “investment vehicles,” and as a result, they should be excluded from 
the federal law definitions of securities.36 He also argued that the 
cryptocurrencies did not fall under the Howey definition of an investment 
contract because: (1) they involved purchases that did not include money;37 
(2) there was neither horizontal nor strict vertical commonality because the 
government alleged neither the pooling of assets nor that the fortunes of the 
purchasers depended on the fortunes of the defendants;38 and (3) purchaser 
                                                                                                                     
26 Zaslavskiy Memorandum & Order, supra note 3. 
27 328 U.S. 293 (1946). 
28 See Zaslavskiy Memorandum & Order, supra note 3, at *6–17 (reviewing securities case law as 
it relates to the cryptocurrencies in Zaslavskiy). 
29 Id. at *2–3. 
30 Id. at *3 (citations omitted). 
31 Id. (alteration in original). 
32 Id. at *4 (citations omitted). 
33 Id. at *1–2. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. at *1. 
36 Memorandum of Law Supporting Maksim Zaslavkiy’s Motion to Dismiss Indictment at 11–14, 
United States v. Zaslavskiy, No. 17-CR-0647 (RJD) (RER) (E.D.N.Y. 2018), ECF No. 27. 
37 Id. at 15–16. 
38 Id. at 16–17. 
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profits did not depend on the efforts of the cryptocurrency promoters.39 
Notably, the defendant argued that the “decentralized” nature of blockchain 
is “resistant” to horizontal commonality.40 Furthermore, the defendant 
argued that the “context” did not indicate that the cryptocurrencies were 
investment contracts in part because “purchasers . . . did not purchase any 
interest in a legal entity.”41  
Judge Dearie of the Eastern District of New York ruled that a reasonable 
jury could find the Government’s argument persuasive and consequently 
consider the defendant’s cryptocurrencies to be investment contracts.42 
However, the court stressed that “[w]hether a transaction or instrument 
qualifies as an investment contract is a highly fact-specific inquiry.”43 
Therefore, the court left to the jury the ultimate question of whether the 
cryptocurrencies in this case amounted to securities. This case highlights 
how the way in which a court interprets the definition of “securities” under 
relevant securities laws and regulations is the predominant factor in 
determining whether cryptocurrency can be regulated by federal securities 
laws. The court concluded that if the jury found that the three prongs of the 
Howey test were satisfied, then that jury could reasonably find that the 
cryptocurrencies constituted securities.44 In its discussion of the three prongs 
of the Howey test, the court provided useful insights regarding other cases 
that have guided securities law jurisprudence since Howey.45 
The first prong of the Howey test is whether “individuals invested money 
(and other forms of payment) in order to participate in [the defendant’s] 
schemes.”46 In discussing this prong, the court cited persuasive authority to 
stress the importance of an investment to the definition of a security. First, 
the court cited SEC v. SG Ltd.,47 which stated that for the first Howey prong, 
“[t]he determining factor is whether an investor ‘chose to give up a specific 
consideration in return for a separable financial interest with the 
characteristics of a security.’”48 Next, the court cited SEC v. Brigadoon 
Scotch Distributors, Ltd.,49 in which the Southern District of New York put 
weight in evidence that the defendants advertised the money they sought as 
                                                                                                                     
39 Id. at 18–20. 
40 Id. at 17. 
41 Id. at 20. 
42 Zaslavskiy Memorandum & Order, supra note 3, at *10. 
43 Id. at *9 (citing SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946) and Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 
U.S. 551, 560 n.11 (1982)). 
44 Id. at *10–16. 
45 Id. at *6–17. 
46 Id. at *10–11 (emphasis added) (citing Howey, 328 U.S. at 299–300). 
47 Id. (quoting SEC v. SG Ltd., 265 F.3d 42, 48 (1st Cir. 2001)). 
48 SG Ltd., 265 F.3d at 48. 
49 Zaslavskiy Memorandum & Order, supra note 3, at *11 (citing SEC v. Brigadoon Scotch Distrib., 
Ltd., 388 F. Supp. 1288, 1291 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)). 
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an “investment.”50 Finally, and perhaps most importantly for the purposes 
of this Note, Judge Dearie cast disfavor on the defendant’s argument that 
those who paid for the cryptocurrency did so as an “exchange of one medium 
of currency for another.”51 The judge pointed out that the indictment alleged 
that the “exchange” was actually for “membership” in the cryptocurrency 
“ventures.”52 This “exchange,” as this Note previously described, was 
premised on the promise that the purchasers would receive interests in 
diamond and real estate-backed tokens, which would purportedly increase 
in value based on real estate investments and/or the growth of the 
cryptocurrencies.53 
Next, the court discussed the second prong of the Howey test: that the 
cryptocurrency “constituted a ‘common enterprise.’”54 The court cited 
International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Daniel,55 which declared that 
“the ‘touchstone’ of the Howey test ‘is the presence of an investment in a 
common venture premised on a reasonable expectation of profits to be 
derived from the entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of others.’”56 Judge 
Dearie stressed the necessity of “commonality” and noted that “horizontal 
commonality” is enough to demonstrate a common enterprise—at least in 
the Second Circuit.57 He described horizontal commonality as when assets 
or funds are shared and each investor’s return depends on “the profitability 
of the enterprise as a whole.”58 Judge Dearie found that the Government 
could satisfy Howey’s second prong because the cryptocurrencies 
purportedly relied on the pooling of funds for buying real estate and 
diamonds and because the defendant promised the investors virtual pieces 
of currency that were in proportion to their investment interest.59 The court 
referenced how the courts in both Howey and SG Ltd. found significance in 
the fact that investors were given “shares” or “capital units” that were 
proportional to their interests in the respective enterprises.60 Notably, the 
court stated that evidence that the defendant promised pieces of virtual 
currency to investors did not detract from the allegation that he had pooled 
assets as part of his scheme.61 
                                                                                                                     
50 Brigadoon Scotch Distrib., Ltd., 388 F. Supp. at 1291. 
51 Zaslavskiy Memorandum & Order, supra note 3, at *11 (internal quotation marks omitted) (also 
noting that the defendant made this argument “glibly”). 
52 Id. (citations omitted). 
53 Id. at *3–4. 
54 Id. at *12 (citations omitted). 
55 Id. (citing Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 561 (1979)). 
56 Daniel, 439 U.S. at 561 (quoting United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 852 (1975)). 
57 Zaslavskiy Memorandum & Order, supra note 3, at *12 (quoting Revak v. SEC Realty Corp., 18 
F.3d 81, 87 (2d Cir. 1994)). 
58 Id. at *13 (quoting Revak, 18 F.3d at 87). 
59 Id. (quoting Revak, 18 F.3d at 87–88). 
60 Id. at *13–14 (citations omitted). 
61 Id. at *14. 
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For the third prong of Howey, the court stated that in order to find the 
defendant guilty of securities fraud, the jury would have to find that 
“investors were led to expect profits in [the defendant’s cryptocurrencies] to 
be derived solely from the managerial efforts of [the defendant] and his 
co-conspirators, not any efforts of the investors themselves.”62 The court 
cited SEC v. Edwards,63 which held that a key aspect of an investment 
contract is “the presence of an investment in a common venture premised on 
a reasonable expectation of profits to be derived from the entrepreneurial or 
managerial efforts of others.”64 Relying on Edwards, Forman, and the SEC’s 
July 2017 Report of Investigation, the court found that the “grow[th] in 
value” that the defendant promised to investors qualified as profits for 
purposes of the third prong of the Howey test.65 The court further reasoned 
that investors “could have reasonably expected” that any profits they gained 
would be “primarily” from the efforts of the defendant and his 
co-conspirators rather than from the investors themselves.66 The court 
gathered this from evidence that the defendant advertised having “the 
soundest” investment strategies and from evidence that the investors did not 
have any control over how the defendant used the investments he collected.67 
Judge Dearie made this ruling—even though investors would purportedly 
have the opportunity to trade their virtual coins for profit—because the 
investors did not have oversight in the management of the pooled 
investments of the cryptocurrencies.68 
Finally, the Zaslavskiy court rejected the defendant’s argument that the 
cryptocurrencies could not be securities because they were currency.69 The 
court pointed out that no currency ever existed in this fraud case and cited 
Edwards and Forman in emphasizing that the definition of security should 
focus on substance and economic reality, rather than form.70 Judge Dearie 
later referenced SEC v. Zandford in noting that “securities laws are meant to 
be interpreted ‘flexibly to effectuate [their] remedial purpose.’”71  
Furthermore, he stated that the purpose of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 
is to prevent the exact conduct which the defendant allegedly committed—
the potentially fraudulent “use [of] the money of others on the promise of 
                                                                                                                     
62 Id. (citations omitted). 
63 Id. (citing SEC v. Edwards, 540 U.S. 389, 395 (2004)). 
64 Edwards, 540 U.S. at 395 (citation omitted). 
65 Zaslavskiy Memorandum & Order, supra note 3, at *14–15 (citations omitted). 
66 Id. at *15. 
67 Id. at *15–16 (citations omitted). 
68 Id. 
69 Id. at *16–17 (citing, in part, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (2012), which precludes currency from being 
a security if certain conditions are met). 
70 Id. at *17 (citing SEC v. Edwards, 540 U.S. 389, 393 (2004) and United Hous. Found., Inc. v. 
Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 848 (1975)). 
71 Id. at *19 (alteration in original) (quoting SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 819 (2002)). 
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profits.”72 As such, the conduct that the Government charged in the 
indictment fell within the purpose of the statute.73 
This review of Zaslavskiy is important, not only because it was a 
groundbreaking decision, but also because it demonstrates the cutting edge 
of judicial decision making involving cryptocurrency and securities 
regulation. It shows the arguments that the Federal Government, other 
plaintiffs, and defendants in securities litigation might use in such conflicts, 
and it illustrates the authorities that judges might cite in justifying their 
decisions to include cryptocurrency and ICOs in the purview of securities 
regulations. Finally, Zaslavskiy supplies an example of the type of case that 
might come to the Supreme Court on appeal. It shows the type of reasoning 
that the Supreme Court might need to reverse if it intends to curtail the ability 
of the Federal Government to regulate cryptocurrency under securities 
regulations. 
Based on the way Judge Dearie described the cryptocurrencies in 
Zaslavskiy, it may seem obvious that ICOs will always constitute securities. 
Based on this assessment, some might argue that failing to classify such 
cryptocurrencies as securities only serves to leave those seeking to raise 
capital with a way to evade securities laws and thereby put investors at risk. 
But this is hardly true of all cryptocurrency-based capital raises. Imagine, 
for example, an ICO for a cryptocurrency that can only be used within a 
specific network. As Attorney Michael Mendelson noted, certain “digital 
tokens sold for use in established networks that only have utility within those 
networks . . . might appear less likely to be considered securities” under the 
Supreme Court’s holding in Forman.74 However, SEC Chairman Jay 
Clayton stated that “[m]erely calling a token a ‘utility’ token or structuring 
it to provide some utility does not prevent the token from being a security.”75 
Attorney Mendelson concluded that “[h]istory will ultimately decide 
whether the courts will follow Forman or Clayton in assessing whether the 
token purchases are motivated by the desire to build and use a product or to 
generate investment profits.”76   
                                                                                                                     
72 Id. at *21 (citation omitted). 
73 Id. 
74 Mendelson, supra note 14, at 78 (citing Forman, 421 U.S. at 838). 
75 Id. at 78–79 (quoting Jay Clayton, Public Statement: Statement on Cryptocurrencies and Initial 
Coin Offerings (Dec. 11, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/statement-clayton-2017-12-
11). 
76 Id. at 79. It is important to note that Michael Mendelson came to the opposite conclusion from 
this Note regarding the SEC’s regulation of cryptocurrency. Attorney Mendelson stated that “[t]he SEC 
was right” to “lay[] down the law” and “declare[] its jurisdiction” over ICOs. Id. at 52. Attorney 
Mendelson further declared that “[t]here is no doubt that the overwhelming majority of ICOs involve the 
sale of securities and companies who ignore this conclusion do so at their own risk.” Id. Still, his work 
offers support to a central premise of this Note. Importantly, Attorney Mendelson continued on to say: 
“Yet the law of ICOs and digital token financing is by no means final or clear, and with little official 
guidance to go on, startups are left to fend for themselves in a sea of self-declared experts.” Id. 
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Thus, so-called “utility tokens” provide an example of how there is still 
uncertainty regarding which cryptocurrencies must be registered with the 
SEC, even when those cryptocurrencies involve ICOs. In fact, despite the 
SEC’s assertion of authority over certain ICOs, it remains the case that 
“companies must perform a thorough technical network analysis and an 
equally thorough regulatory analysis to determine whether their tokens could 
be considered a security.”77 Indeed, Commissioner Hester M. Pierce noted 
in September 2018 that “the application of Howey to a particular ICO does 
not answer every question.”78 Commissioner Pierce also noted: “Crypto 
tokens are still evolving, and there are many people thinking through these 
issues right now.”79 
II. THE MAJOR QUESTIONS DOCTRINE AND CRYPTOCURRENCY 
REGULATION 
About thirty-five years ago, Chevron changed the way in which courts 
assess the role of administrative agencies. In Chevron, the Supreme Court 
directed that when reviewing an agency’s interpretation of a statute, courts 
should first ask “whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise 
question at issue.”80 If the answer is yes, then Congress’s “unambiguously 
expressed intent” must prevail.81 However, if Congress has not spoken 
directly to the matter, “the question for the court is whether the agency’s 
answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.”82 The Court 
further explained that where Congress has implicitly allowed regulatory 
discretion to federal agencies on specific issues, “a court may not substitute 
its own construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation 
made by the administrator of an agency.”83 Yet, while the Chevron doctrine 
allows federal agencies to exercise considerable discretion, another 
doctrine—the “major questions doctrine”—provides a way to restrain them. 
A. Major Questions Doctrine Precedent 
The major questions doctrine insists that “agencies need clear 
authorization from Congress to pass regulations with major economic and 
political significance.”84 In Brown & Williamson, a case regarding tobacco 
                                                                                                                     
77 Id. at 54. 
78 Id. at 82 (citing Hester Pierce, Wolves and Wolverines: Remarks at the University of Michigan 
Law School, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMM’N (Sept. 24, 2018), 
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speech-peirce-092418). 
79 Pierce, supra note 78. 
80 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984). 
81 Id. at 842–43. 
82 Id. at 843. 
83 Id. at 844. 
84 CRS KAVANAUGH REPORT, supra note 20, at 51 (footnote omitted). 
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regulation, the Supreme Court stated that it “must be guided to a degree by 
common sense as to the manner in which Congress is likely to delegate a 
policy decision of such economic and political magnitude to an 
administrative agency.”85 The Court further asserted that there are 
“extraordinary cases” in which “there may be reason to hesitate before 
concluding that Congress has intended . . . an implicit delegation” of 
authority to a federal agency.86   
A review of major questions doctrine precedent reveals a few important 
themes. First, the Supreme Court has been hesitant to defer to administrative 
agencies on questions that carry political significance. For example, in 
Brown & Williamson, the Court noted that “[o]wing to its unique place in 
American history and society, tobacco has its own unique political 
history.”87 The Court found importance in Congress’s “distinct regulatory 
scheme for tobacco products” and its rejection of proposals to give the FDA 
power over tobacco regulation.88 The Court ultimately decided not to defer 
to the FDA’s statutory interpretation.89 Similarly, in a case involving the 
Attorney General’s jurisdiction over the issue of physician-assisted suicide, 
the Court stated that “[t]he importance of the issue of physician-assisted 
suicide, which has been the subject of an earnest and profound debate across 
the country, makes the oblique form of the [Attorney General’s] claimed 
delegation all the more suspect.”90 
Additionally, the Supreme Court has been hesitant to defer to federal 
agencies in cases involving issues of major economic significance. In Brown 
& Williamson, the Supreme Court observed that the FDA had “asserted 
jurisdiction to regulate an industry constituting a significant portion of the 
American economy.”91 In the recent case of Utility Air Regulatory Group v. 
EPA, the Supreme Court quoted Brown & Williamson in finding that 
“[w]hen an agency claims to discover in a long-extant statute an unheralded 
power to regulate ‘a significant portion of the American economy,’ we 
typically greet its announcement with a measure of skepticism.”92 
Furthermore, in MCI Telecommunications Corp., the Supreme Court 
discussed the question of whether the Federal Communications Commission 
                                                                                                                     
85 FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000). 
86 Id. at 159. 
87 Id. 
88 Id. at 159–60. 
89 Id. 
90 Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 262, 267–68 (2006) (internal citation and internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
91 Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 159. 
92 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2444 (2014) (quoting Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 159). See also Indus. 
Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 645 (1980) (“In the absence of a clear 
mandate in the Act, it is unreasonable to assume that Congress intended to give the Secretary the 
unprecedented power over American industry that would result from the Government’s view of §§ 3(8) 
and 6(b)(5), coupled with OSHA’s cancer policy[.]”). 
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(FCC) had the ability to eliminate rate-filing requirements under a statutory 
provision that allowed it to “modify” such requirements.93 The Court found 
that the FCC did not have such authority and noted that “an elimination of 
the crucial provision of the statute for 40% [of the customers] of a major 
sector of the industry is much too extensive to be considered a 
‘modification.’”94 These cases demonstrate that the Supreme Court has 
hesitated to extend Chevron deference not only when the regulation would 
affect a significant portion of the American economy, but also when the 
regulation would affect an industry that constitutes a significant portion of 
the American economy. 
Furthermore, some lower courts have exhibited a willingness to invoke 
the major questions doctrine in cases involving technological innovation. 
For example, Judge O’Malley of the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals 
recognized this theme in a recent concurring opinion regarding internet 
regulation.95 Finding support in Supreme Court precedent, Judge O’Malley 
wrote that “the responsibility lies with Congress to decide how best to 
address these new developments in technology.”96 The two cases that Judge 
O’Malley cited—Gottschalk and Microsoft Corp.—involved the 
patentability of computer programming.97 In Gottschalk, the Supreme Court 
opined that: 
If these programs are to be patentable, considerable problems 
are raised which only committees of Congress can manage, for 
broad powers of investigation are needed, including hearings 
which canvass the wide variety of views which those operating 
in this field entertain. The technological problems tendered in 
the many briefs before us indicated to us that considered action 
by the Congress is needed.98 
Similarly, in Microsoft Corp., the Court stated that “[i]f the patent law 
is to be adjusted better to account for the realities of software distribution, 
the alteration should be made after focused legislative consideration, and not 
by the Judiciary forecasting Congress’ likely disposition.”99 Such cases are 
examples of a judicial desire for clear guidance from Congress when 
agencies make policy that affects developing technologies, especially 
computer programs and the internet.  
                                                                                                                     
93 MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218, 231 (1994). 
94 Id. 
95 ClearCorrect Operating, LLC v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 810 F.3d 1283, 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2015) 
(O’Malley, J., concurring). 
96 Id. (citing Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 458–59 (2007) and Gottschalk v. 
Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 73 (1972)). 
97 Microsoft Corp., 550 U.S. at 458; Gottschalk, 409 U.S. at 71. 
98 Gottschalk, 409 U.S. at 73. 
99 Microsoft Corp., 550 U.S. at 458–59 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
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Major questions doctrine precedent could play an important role in how 
the Supreme Court decides whether the SEC can regulate cryptocurrency. 
The Court might decide that cryptocurrency regulation is a matter of major 
economic, political, or technological importance and consequently restrict 
the SEC from exercising jurisdiction over the field. 
On a broader scale, the major questions doctrine is poised, going 
forward, to play an increasingly prominent role in reshaping administrative 
law. This is largely due to recent shifts in Supreme Court membership. In 
2018, Justice Brett Kavanaugh replaced former Justice Anthony Kennedy.100 
Justice Kavanaugh might be the swing vote on issues regarding the 
regulatory power of federal agencies and, more specifically, agency power 
to regulate cryptocurrency.101 In several cases heard during his time on the 
Court, Justice Kennedy was the deciding vote in decisions involving the 
Chevron doctrine.102 Just days before announcing that he would retire from 
the Court, Justice Kennedy signaled that the Court should rethink its 
approach to Chevron, a position that he seemed to think at least three of his 
colleagues would support.103 Justice Kavanaugh has both voiced 
disagreement with Chevron and indicated support for the major questions 
doctrine. His influence might lead the Court to reexamine the Chevron 
doctrine and, if not change it radically, at least rein in regulatory agencies 
on issues of major importance. 
B. The Potential Shift in Supreme Court Doctrine Applied to 
Cryptocurrency Regulation 
The definitions for “security” in both the Exchange Act and the 
Securities Act list a variety of devices that could qualify as securities.104 
These lists include devices like stocks, bonds, and put and call options.105 As 
                                                                                                                     
100 Stolberg, supra note 19. 
101 CRS KAVANAUGH REPORT, supra note 20, at 44 (noting that Justice Kennedy “often [found] 
himself as a decisive vote in important administrative law cases during the Roberts Court era”). 
102 Id. 
103 Id. (citing Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2121 (2018) (Kennedy, J., concurring)) (also 
noting that this “signals to some that the Court may be on the verge of recrafting foundational 
administrative law doctrines”); see Pereira, 138 S. Ct. at 2120–21 (citing Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 
2699, 2712–14 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring); City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 312–28, 327 
(2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); and Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1149–58 (10th Cir. 
2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring)) (“[W]hen deference is applied to other questions of statutory 
interpretation, such as an agency’s interpretation of the statutory provisions that concern the scope of its 
own authority, it is more troubling still. Given the concerns raised by some Members of this Court, it 
seems necessary and appropriate to reconsider, in an appropriate case, the premises that underlie Chevron 
and how courts have implemented that decision. The proper rules for interpreting statutes and 
determining agency jurisdiction and substantive agency powers should accord with constitutional 
separation-of-powers principles and the function and province of the Judiciary.”). 
104 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (2012); 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (2012). 
105 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10); 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1). 
 
343891-Connecticut_Law_52-2_Text.indd   477 7/28/20   10:49 AM
 
1006 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:2 
this Note previously discussed, the Acts’ inclusion of “investment contracts” 
in their definitions for securities has been used by a federal judge to allow 
cryptocurrency to be the subject of federal securities regulations.106 But, 
notably missing from the list of items that Congress explicitly stated could 
qualify as securities is the word “cryptocurrency.” Justice Kavanaugh has 
demonstrated a propensity to restrain the powers of federal agencies, 
especially where there is no explicit guidance from Congress about how that 
agency should act.107 Based on Justice Kavanaugh’s written opinions, it is 
entirely possible that he would hold—and lead the Supreme Court to hold—
that, because the Exchange Act and the Securities Act do not specifically list 
cryptocurrency within their “securities” definitions, cryptocurrency is not a 
valid subject for securities regulation. If this view prevails, the SEC might 
need to look to Congress for a more specific grant of authority over 
cryptocurrency and ICOs. As a result, Justice Kavanaugh’s judicial 
philosophy could have a drastic effect on the use of securities laws to 
regulate cryptocurrency and ICOs. 
Under existing administrative law, the question of whether 
cryptocurrency qualifies as a security is subject to Chevron deference. 
Hypothetically, in order to determine whether to defer to the SEC’s 
interpretation of the Exchange Act and the Securities Act, courts should first 
look to whether the definition for “security” as defined by federal law—or a 
specific part of that definition—is clear or ambiguous. But under Justice 
Kavanaugh’s proposal for modified Chevron analysis, courts should only 
defer to agency interpretations when the statutory language in question 
involves words like “reasonable,” “practicable,” “appropriate,” or 
“feasible.”108 Notably, neither of the federal definitions for “security” 
involve this type of language.109 Rather, these definitions involve what 
Justice Kavanaugh would call, “specific statutory term[s] or phrase[s].”110 
Thus, Justice Kavanaugh would likely try to determine the “best reading of 
the statutory text” of the definitions.111 It is unlikely, under that standard, 
that the definition sections of federal securities statutes include 
cryptocurrency. Not only do they fail to list “cryptocurrency” as a security, 
but the definition in the Exchange Act specifically excludes “currency or 
                                                                                                                     
106 See supra Part I (discussing Judge Dearie’s memorandum and order in Zaslavskiy). 
107 U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 855 F.3d 381, 417 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting); 
Coal. for Responsible Regulation, Inc. v. EPA, No. 09-1322, 2012 WL 6621785, at *14 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 
20, 2012) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting from denial of reh’g en banc). See also Jacob Gershman, Brett 
Kavanaugh Has Shown Deep Skepticism of Regulatory State, WALL ST. J. (July 9, 2018, 11:14 PM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/nominee-has-shown-deep-skepticism-of-regulatory-state-1531186402 
(“Judge Kavanaugh praised the late Justice Antonin Scalia for putting more focus on the text of statutes—
and the meaning of words and phrases in the law—when evaluating regulations.”). 
108 Fixing Statutory Interpretation, supra note 21, at 2153. 
109 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10); 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1). 
110 Fixing Statutory Interpretation, supra note 21, at 2154. 
111 Id. 
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any note.”112 While the Federal Government has tried to define 
cryptocurrencies as securities in specific instances,113 it is at best unclear 
whether cryptocurrencies as a whole qualify as securities. As such, since 
Justice Kavanaugh has written that in administrative law cases, it is often 
most important to look to “the precise wording of the statutory text,”114 he 
would likely be hesitant to insert cryptocurrency into the federal definitions 
of securities. 
Even under the Supreme Court’s current Chevron analysis framework, 
Justice Kavanaugh would be unlikely to include cryptocurrency in the 
definitions of “security” under federal law. First, given his propensity to find 
statutes clear rather than ambiguous,115 Justice Kavanaugh might simply find 
that the definitions clearly do not include cryptocurrencies. But, even if he 
were to find the Acts ambiguous, Justice Kavanaugh would still be unlikely 
to find that the SEC has the power to regulate cryptocurrency. This is due to 
the potential for Justice Kavanaugh to apply the major questions doctrine. 
There are plenty of reasons to argue that cryptocurrency regulation is of 
“major economic and political significance.”116 Not only are ICOs being 
utilized to raise billions of dollars,117 but also, as will be discussed at greater 
length in Part III of this Note,118 a “major U.S. bank” has created a 
cryptocurrency for potential use in connection with its wholesale payments 
business that “moves . . . $6 trillion around the world every day.”119 The 
implications of developments like these may well place cryptocurrency 
regulation into the same league as “regulating cigarettes” and “eliminating 
telecommunications rate-filing requirements”120 for Justice Kavanaugh. 
Even when following the traditional Chevron analysis, Justice Kavanaugh 
views such “major regulatory action[s]” as requiring clear congressional 
authorization.121 Accordingly, he might be unlikely to defer to the SEC over 
                                                                                                                     
112 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10). 
113 See, e.g., Zaslavskiy Memorandum & Order, supra note 3, at *1–2 (“The Government, 
meanwhile, asserts that the investments made in REcoin and Diamond were investment contracts and 
thus securities . . . .” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). 
114 Brett M. Kavanaugh, The Courts and the Administrative State, 64 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 711, 
716 (2014) [hereinafter The Courts and the Administrative State]. 
115 See Fixing Statutory Interpretation, supra note 21, at 2137 (“I tend to be a judge who finds 
clarity more readily than some of my colleagues but perhaps a little less readily than others. In practice, 
I probably apply something approaching a 65-35 rule. In other words, if the interpretation is at least 65-35 
clear, then I will call it clear and reject reliance on ambiguity-dependent canons.” (footnote omitted)). 
116 CRS KAVANAUGH REPORT, supra note 20, at 51. 
117 Osipovich, supra note 3. 
118 See infra Part III.A. 
119 Hugh Son, JP Morgan Is Rolling Out the First US Bank-Backed Cryptocurrency to Transform 
Payments Business, CNBC (Feb. 14, 2019, 5:59 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/02/13/jp-morgan-is-
rolling-out-the-first-us-bank-backed-cryptocurrency-to-transform-payments--.html. 
120 U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 855 F.3d 381, 421 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). 
121 Id. 
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the question of whether it can regulate cryptocurrency. He might lead a 
changed Supreme Court to do the same. 
III. THE UNDESIRABILITY OF PIECEMEAL CRYPTOCURRENCY REGULATION 
BY THE SEC 
In an August 2018 interview with the Wall Street Journal, John L. 
Hennessy—who chairs Alphabet Inc., Google’s parent company—said the 
following in regards to technology regulation: “There’s a bigger role for 
somebody to play here, whether it’s government or the nonprofit sector. The 
challenge with government is, it tends to operate at a pace that is so slow. I 
get nervous about government’s ability to legislate in fast-moving, deep 
technology fields.”122 This type of skepticism—about whether the Federal 
Government can keep up with innovations in the area of technology—bears 
directly on the debate over whether the SEC should have a role in regulating 
cryptocurrency. If the SEC is struggling to keep up with everchanging 
technology, will allowing it to regulate ICOs—and cryptocurrency more 
broadly—only lead to confusion and instability? 
Before going further, it must be noted that, while skepticism of federal 
agencies is not uncommon,123 there are strong arguments against such 
skepticism. On the other side of the coin is the question of whether, by taking 
cryptocurrency regulation out of the hands of the SEC, the Supreme Court 
would effectively extinguish any chance that the Federal Government has to 
keep up with the issue. In fact, rather than having the inability to keep up, 
one criticism of federal agencies is that they can move entirely too fast.124 
                                                                                                                     
122 Douglas MacMillan, Alphabet’s Chairman on Government, China and Fake News, WALL ST. J. 
(Aug. 31, 2018, 9:00 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/alphabets-chairman-on-government-china-
and-fake-news-1535720400. 
123 See, e.g., Elizabeth Slattery, Who Will Regulate the Regulators? Administrative Agencies, the 
Separation of Powers, and Chevron Deference, HERITAGE FOUND. (May 7, 2015), 
https://www.heritage.org/courts/report/who-will-regulate-the-regulators-administrative-agencies-the-
separation-powers-and#_ftn7 (criticizing federal agencies, using Justice Breyer’s statement that 
“[a]gency decisions will also occasionally reflect ‘tunnel vision,’ an agency’s supreme confidence in the 
importance of its own mission to the point where it leaves common sense aside” (quoting Stephen Breyer, 
The Executive Branch, Administrative Action, and Comparative Expertise, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 2189, 
2195 (2011))); Jonathan Turley, Opinion, The Rise of the Fourth Branch of Government, WASH. POST 
(May 24, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-rise-of-the-fourth-branch-of-
government/2013/05/24/c7faaad0-c2ed-11e2-9fe2-6ee52d0eb7c1_story.html?utm_ 
term=.96bae49004cd (“Our carefully constructed system of checks and balances is being negated by the 
rise of a fourth branch, an administrative state of sprawling departments and agencies that govern with 
increasing autonomy and decreasing transparency.”). 
124 Clyde Wayne Crews Jr., How Many Rules and Regulations Do Federal Agencies Issue?, FORBES 
(Aug. 15, 2017, 12:48 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/waynecrews/2017/08/15/how-many-rules-
and-regulations-do-federal-agencies-issue/#10a2aa4e1e64 (“[I]ncreasingly, since the federal 
government is so pervasive, it can regulate private activity without waiting for Congress to pass a law, 
and without even going through the normal notice-and-comment rulemaking process to which agencies 
‘must’ adhere. That threatens conservative and liberal values alike.”). 
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From 1995 through 2016, federal agencies created 88,890 rules and 
regulations, while Congress passed only 4312 public laws.125 With a 
policymaking rate much greater than that of Congress, some would argue 
that federal agencies like the SEC are best equipped to handle a quickly 
developing issue like cryptocurrency regulation. 
Another potential argument against curtailing the regulatory state in a 
way that restricts the SEC’s power to regulate cryptocurrency is that such a 
restriction would reject the guidance in Howey—a case upon which much of 
the federal securities regulation jurisprudence is based.126 In Howey, the 
Supreme Court stated that a security “embodies a flexible rather than a static 
principle, one that is capable of adaptation to meet the countless and variable 
schemes devised by those who seek the use of the money of others on the 
promise of profits.”127 This interpretation has allowed the SEC wide latitude 
to group a variety of devices into the definition of a “security” for more than 
seventy years.128 Thus, to carve out cryptocurrency as one device that is not 
a security could lead to instability in the law. Consequently, it could have 
the opposite effect of one of the exclusion’s potential goals: creating a more 
stable regulatory structure by only allowing the SEC to regulate the 
securities that Congress clearly listed in the Securities Act and the Exchange 
Act. The sudden shift in jurisprudence could cause an avalanche of lawsuits 
challenging whether other devices are in fact securities under this new 
precedent. 
Furthermore, some might argue that forcing the SEC and federal 
prosecutors to look to Congress for explicit authority to regulate 
cryptocurrency is simply an exercise in procedure for the sake of procedure. 
They might argue that asking Congress to add the word “cryptocurrency” to 
the definitions for securities in the Exchange Act and the Securities Act 
simply bogs down the Federal Government in procedure for no difference in 
substance. The argument might be stated as: if Congress would surely add 
the word, then why waste our time as cryptocurrency grows without proper 
regulations? But this argument rests on two shaky assumptions. First, the 
argument assumes without certainty that Congress would simply add 
“cryptocurrency” to the list of items to be considered securities. Second, on 
a broader public policy level, the argument assumes that Congress would 
decide that securities regulations are the best way to regulate this field. 
                                                                                                                     
125 Id. 
126 See, e.g., Zaslavskiy Memorandum & Order, supra note 3, at *20 (noting the “abundance of case 
law interpreting and applying Howey at all levels of the judiciary”). 
127 SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299 (1946). 
128 See Zaslavskiy Memorandum & Order, supra note 3, at *19–20 (noting that “courts are clear 
that the securities laws are meant to be interpreted flexibly to effectuate [their] remedial purpose” and 
that “the test expounded in Howey has—for over 70 years—provided clear guidance to courts and 
litigants as to the definition of investment contract under the securities laws” (alteration in original) 
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). 
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Perhaps, after hours of legislative hearing testimony and pages of legislative 
research reports, Congress would decide that another regulatory structure, 
such as one involving other banking regulators, would be best fit to regulate 
cryptocurrency. Or, perhaps, Congress would decide that the unique nature 
of cryptocurrency places it within an overlap of multiple existing regulatory 
structures and thereby authorize the applicable federal agencies to take 
charge. Or, to expand the spectrum of possibilities even further, perhaps 
Congress would opt to craft a new regulatory structure altogether to deal 
with this new and everchanging field.129 
Despite the counterarguments discussed above, the SEC should not be 
regulating cryptocurrency at this time. The arguments in this Section begin 
with the basic premise that innovation is an asset to society. More 
specifically, this Section is premised on the idea that innovation in the area 
of cryptocurrency is generally positive and something that should be 
encouraged. Some argue that innovation in financial instruments has led to 
detrimental consequences, including the 2008 financial crisis.130 However, 
innovation has brought to the economy automated teller machines, debit 
cards, mutual funds, and venture capital funds, to name just a few financial 
developments since the 1960s.131 Such innovations have had many positive 
effects on the U.S. economy. They have revolutionized investing and the 
way money moves throughout the United States and the world. Despite the 
fact that developing financial instruments can be abused, their benefits 
outweigh their potential risks. When innovation is unleashed and spreads 
between companies and industries—a process called “diffusion”—the 
process promotes economic growth.132 
The innovation that provides the benefits discussed above does not occur 
in a straight line. It is not always clear how innovators will change a product 
or an industry. This is especially true for a rapidly developing, multi-faceted 
subject like cryptocurrency. Because cryptocurrency development can occur 
in a variety of ways, it inherently creates a certain amount of gray area. That 
is to say that cryptocurrency can develop in both foreseen and unforeseen 
ways that are not easily placed into the jurisdiction of any particular federal 
agency. It is helpful to think of the current state of cryptocurrency and the 
                                                                                                                     
129 See Sarah Jane Hughes & Stephen T. Middlebrook, Advancing a Framework for Regulating 
Cryptocurrency Payments Intermediaries, 32 YALE J. ON REG. 495, 495 (2015) (“We conclude that, in 
addition to whatever ‘money services’ or ‘money transmission’ prudential regulation the States or federal 
government may adopt, the operation of wallets and exchanges requires a new commercial law that lays 
out rights and liabilities of cryptocurrency users in a robust and transparent fashion.”). 
130 Douglas J. Elliott, Op-Ed: The Pros and Cons of Financial Innovation, BROOKINGS (Feb. 25, 
2010), https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/the-pros-and-cons-of-financial-innovation/. 
131 Id. 
132 Jason Douglas et al., The Problem with Innovation: The Biggest Companies Are Hogging All 
the Gains, WALL ST. J. (July 15, 2018, 2:45 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-problem-with-
innovation-the-biggest-companies-are-hogging-all-the-gains-1531680310. 
 
343891-Connecticut_Law_52-2_Text.indd   482 7/28/20   10:49 AM
 
2020] CRYPTOCURRENCY AND THE SEC 1011 
possibilities for cryptocurrency innovation as existing on a spectrum. On one 
end, there is the group of cryptocurrencies that are simply used as a medium 
of exchange, like Bitcoin. These are the cryptocurrencies that may more 
closely resemble fiat currency or electronic payment systems and do not 
appear to be securities.133 On the other end of the spectrum are ICOs that are 
solely used as investment vehicles and seem the most like securities. In the 
middle of the spectrum exist cryptocurrencies such as “utility tokens,” which 
do not neatly fit into the categories at either end of the spectrum and may 
not exhibit all of the traits necessary to meet the Howey test.134 With this 
spectrum in mind, it appears that while some areas of cryptocurrency—such 
as cryptocurrencies involving ICOs—might be appropriately suited for SEC 
regulation, other forms of cryptocurrency are not. In fact, there may even be 
aspects of cryptocurrencies involving ICOs that seem ill-suited for SEC 
regulation. This gray area will continue to expand as cryptocurrency 
continues to develop in a non-linear fashion. This leads to uncertainty for 
cryptocurrency innovators. If these innovators could turn to a single 
regulator as a sort of “one stop shop” for the regulations that they must 
follow, the innovators could be more certain that they are complying with 
all applicable rules. In addition, that regulator would be better suited to adapt 
to the changing field of cryptocurrency than currently-existing federal 
regulators because cryptocurrency would be the new regulator’s exclusive 
focus. 
With the benefits of innovation in mind, this Note expresses concern for 
allowing the SEC to regulate cryptocurrency absent clearer congressional 
authorization for three main reasons. First, cryptocurrency regulation is 
developing into a major question because cryptocurrency is a subject of 
immense innovation and a growing aspect of the U.S. economy. Next, the 
SEC’s involvement could lead to an overall piecemeal approach to 
cryptocurrency regulation on the part of the Federal Government. Finally, a 
lack of certainty in regulation harms smaller innovators more than larger 
innovators. Consequently, this Note argues that specific agencies like the 
SEC should not assert authority over individual aspects of cryptocurrency 
without clear congressional guidance. This Note further argues that, due to 
the changing nature of cryptocurrency, mere coordination between federal 
agencies will not provide sufficient clarity to cryptocurrency innovators.  
Rather, Congress should authorize a new commission or sub-agency to 
grapple with cryptocurrency issues as they arise and provide a “one stop 
shop” to which cryptocurrency innovators can turn for regulatory guidance. 
                                                                                                                     
133 See Gerelyn Terzo, SEC: ICO Tokens Should Be Regulated as Securities, Not Bitcoin, YAHOO! 
FIN. (Apr. 27, 2018), https://finance.yahoo.com/news/sec-ico-tokens-regulated-securities-
205650102.html (“Bitcoin, [SEC] Chairman Clayton said, has ‘been determined by most people to not 
be a security.’”). 
134 Mendelson, supra note 14, at 78. 
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A. Cryptocurrency Regulation as a Major Question 
While federal agencies move quicker than Congress and while Howey 
may set a precedent for some degree of flexibility in defining securities, 
there is danger in allowing a federal agency to regulate a new technology on 
the basis of authority that Congress delegated when it had never 
contemplated such a technology. However quickly government agencies 
may be able to move, technology moves faster.135 This is a multilayered 
dilemma in the area of cryptocurrency. Individuals and institutions will 
continue to invent uses for blockchain technology and cryptocurrency in 
ways that are difficult to foresee.136 When Congress defined securities in the 
1930s, not only had it not considered cryptocurrency and blockchain as we 
know it today, but Congress also had not considered the myriad ways in 
which these mechanisms will be used in the future.137 Such rapid innovation 
requires carefully deliberated regulations. Without such deliberation, federal 
agencies can be too quick to become involved in areas in which they do not 
completely belong—both for lack of expertise and for lack of their 
regulatory power’s applicability. Moreover, if courts read into federal law 
SEC authorization to regulate cryptocurrency where it does not exist, they 
fail to respect the “compromise” that Justice Kavanaugh described as 
integral to the legislative process.138 Worse than this, they “tak[e] sides” in 
a debate that should be left to the people’s representatives in Congress.139  
The need for clear congressional direction will be evident with each 
innovation that utilizes cryptocurrency in a new way. This will be especially 
true as cryptocurrency becomes even more of a major component in the U.S. 
economy. Thus, Justice Kavanaugh’s textualist approach correctly leads to 
the conclusion that cryptocurrency regulation invokes the major questions 
doctrine, and accordingly, courts should refuse to extend Chevron deference 
to the SEC as the Commission regulates cryptocurrency without clear 
guidance.140 Take, for example, J.P. Morgan Chase’s recent announcement 
                                                                                                                     
135 See MacMillan, supra note 122 (“The challenge with government is, it tends to operate at a pace 
that is so slow. I get nervous about government’s ability to legislate in fast-moving, deep technology 
fields.”). 
136 See Mohit Kaushal & Sheel Tyle, The Blockchain: What It Is and Why It Matters, BROOKINGS: 
TECHTANK (Jan. 13, 2015), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2015/01/13/the-blockchain-what-
it-is-and-why-it-matters/ (“The Blockchain is a foundational technology, like TCP/IP, which enables the 
Internet. And much like the Internet in the late 1990s, we don’t know exactly how the Blockchain will 
evolve, but evolve it will.”). 
137 See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 79b (Supp. 1935) (offering a definition of securities, 
including items that could not be securities, in a draft resolution). 
138 The Courts and the Administrative State, supra note 114, at 716. 
139 Id. at 716–17. 
140 See CRS KAVANAUGH REPORT, supra note 20, at 54 (“[T]he FCC net neutrality rule, in Judge 
Kavanaugh’s view, clearly qualified as a major rule for purposes of the major rules doctrine. . . . Because 
Congress did not clearly authorize the FCC to promulgate the net neutrality rule, Judge Kavanaugh 
ultimately concluded it was invalid.” (internal citations omitted)). 
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of “JPM Coin.”141 This is a new, groundbreaking development that could 
eventually lead to a vast increase in cryptocurrency’s use throughout the 
world. JPM Coin is one of the first cryptocurrencies that a major U.S. bank 
has crafted.142 According to J.P. Morgan, “a JPM Coin always has a value 
equivalent to one U.S. dollar.”143 Additionally, the bank states that the 
cryptocurrency is “redeemable in fiat currency held by J.P. Morgan (e.g., 
US$)” and is “designed to make instantaneous payments using blockchain 
technology.”144 The bank plans to use JPM Coin “for international payments 
for large corporate clients,” “for securities transactions,” and “for huge 
corporations that use J.P. Morgan’s treasury services business to replace the 
dollars they hold in subsidiaries across the world.”145  
When a development like JPM Coin is viewed along with other uses of 
cryptocurrency, such as the massive amounts of money that have been raised 
through ICOs,146 it becomes clear that cryptocurrency regulation should be 
deemed to have “major economic . . . significance.”147 JPM Coin is 
essentially a fiat currency, even if just for an instant while two parties 
execute a transaction. This cryptocurrency—and others like it—could have 
a massive effect on the banking industry, which, similar to tobacco as 
referenced in Brown & Williamson, is an “industry constituting a significant 
portion of the American economy.”148 In 2016, the finance sector of the U.S. 
economy consisted of twenty percent of the U.S. gross domestic product.149 
Furthermore, J.P. Morgan could soon be using JPM Coin to help it move six 
trillion dollars each day.150 Based on the large portion of the economy that 
it could affect, cryptocurrency regulation should be deemed a major 
question. 
                                                                                                                     
141 Son, supra note 119. 
142 Id.; see also Benjamin Pirus, Signature Bank Beats JPMorgan to Ethereum-Based Token 
Services, FORBES (Feb. 22, 2019, 9:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/benjaminpirus/2019/02/22/ 
signature-bank-already-has-hundreds-of-clients-using-private-ethereum-jpm-coin-still-in-
testing/#51bf0d8d3359 (“JPMorgan Chase recently released a digital asset called JPM Coin, pegged to 
the U.S. dollar, set for testing later in 2019. Misconceptions, however, included JPM Coin was the first 
of its kind, when Signature Bank actually beat them to the punch.”). 
143 J.P. Morgan JPM Coin Announcement, supra note 25. 
144 Id. 
145 Son, supra note 119. 
146 Osipovich, supra note 3 (noting that “$12 billion was raised in ICOs from January through the 
end of June” of 2018). 
147 CRS KAVANAUGH REPORT, supra note 20, at 51. 
148 FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159 (2000). 
149 Christopher Witko, How Wall Street Became a Big Chunk of the U.S. Economy—and When the 
Democrats Signed On, WASH. POST: MONKEY CAGE (Mar. 29, 2016, 12:00 PM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/03/29/how-wall-street-became-a-big-
chunk-of-the-u-s-economy-and-when-the-democrats-signed-on/?utm_term=.9a240df524c8 (“Modern 
economies depend on a thriving financial sector, and the U.S. finance, insurance and real estate (FIRE) 
sector now accounts for 20 percent of GDP—compared with only 10 percent in 1947.”). 
150 Son, supra note 119 (stating that J.P. Morgan Chase currently moves about six trillion dollars 
per day). 
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Furthermore, how such a powerful tool like JPM Coin should be 
regulated is a major issue for the U.S. economy because it has the potential 
to revolutionize how transactions are completed within the United States and 
internationally.151 When cryptocurrency is viewed with JPM Coin in mind, 
the Supreme Court should “greet” the SEC’s “announcement” that it has the 
power to regulate cryptocurrency based on the Securities and Exchange Acts 
“with a measure of skepticism.”152 This was the protocol the Court expressed 
in Utility Air Regulatory Group when an “agency claim[ed] to discover in a 
long-extant statute an unheralded power to regulate a significant portion of 
the American economy.”153 Here, the SEC has found the power to regulate 
cryptocurrency in statutory language from the 1930s.154 The SEC should not 
be able to use less than explicit statutory language that has been in existence 
since long before the inception of cryptocurrency to regulate an issue of such 
profound importance and impact.155 
It is important to note that Congress has already begun to propose ways 
in which cryptocurrency should be regulated. In fact, four bills “focused on 
investigating the criminal use of cryptocurrencies and improving 
government agencies’ ability to address the problem” passed the U.S. House 
of Representatives in 2018.156 Two bills related to the Department of 
Homeland Security assessing the use of cryptocurrencies in terrorist acts.157 
Another pertained to studying how cryptocurrencies are used in sex and drug 
trafficking.158 Meanwhile, a fourth bill would allow the Financial Crimes 
Enforcement Network (FinCEN) to incorporate cryptocurrencies into its 
anti-money laundering work.159 These bills demonstrate that there are a 
variety of ways in which cryptocurrency might be addressed—and a variety 
of ways in which Congress has contemplated doing so. But, in contrast to 
                                                                                                                     
151 Id. (“J.P. Morgan is preparing for a future in which parts of the essential underpinning of global 
capitalism, from cross-border payments to corporate debt issuance, move to the blockchain.”). 
152 Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2444 (2014). 
153 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
154 Colin Harper, “Guidance by Enforcement”: How the SEC Is Slowly Shaping ICO Regulation, 
BITCOIN MAG. (Nov. 30, 2018), https://bitcoinmagazine.com/articles/guidance-enforcement-how-sec-
slowly-shaping-ico-regulation/. 
155 See id. (“The foundation of the securities laws dates back to the 1930s, long before anyone could 
have imagined the concept of a digital asset issued via the internet through the use of blockchain 
technology. This old legal framework simply wasn’t designed for the digital age, and as a result, it doesn’t 
provide the regulatory clarity that the crypto industry needs to move forward.” (quoting Jake Chervinsky, 
an attorney at Kobre & Kim law firm)). 
156 DAVID W. PERKINS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45427, CRYPTOCURRENCY: THE ECONOMICS OF 
MONEY AND SELECTED POLICY ISSUES 17 (2018), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R45427.pdf. 
157 Id. (citing Homeland Security Assessment of Terrorists Use of Virtual Currencies Act, H.R. 
2433, 115th Cong. (1st Sess. 2017) and Financial Technology Protection Act, H.R. 5036, 115th Cong. 
(2d Sess. 2018)). 
158 Id. (citing Fight Illicit Networks and Detect Trafficking Act, H.R. 6069, 115th Cong. (2d Sess. 
2018)). 
159 Id. (citing FinCEN Improvement Act of 2018, H.R. 6411, 115th Cong. (2d Sess. 2018)). 
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the SEC’s attempts to regulate cryptocurrency without clear guidance, these 
bills are examples of explicit guidance that Congress can provide to federal 
agencies to address this major issue. 
Without definitive guidance regarding cryptocurrency regulation, 
federal agencies lack firm footing to regulate the field. This is a predictable 
result—it is to be expected that a federal agency that was not designed to 
address cryptocurrency would not be able to definitively stake a claim of 
jurisdiction over the field as it develops at a rapid pace of technological 
innovation. This lack of footing showed through when the SEC warned that 
it was looking to exert its regulatory power over cryptocurrency. In its July 
2017 Report of Investigation, the SEC “advise[d] those who would use a 
Decentralized Autonomous Organization (‘DAO Entity’), or other 
distributed ledger or blockchain-enabled means for capital raising, to take 
appropriate steps to ensure compliance with the U.S. federal securities 
laws.”160 Yet, the SEC issued the warning in such a way that did not promote 
confidence that Congress had, in fact, provided a clear answer to the 
question of whether the SEC had the authority to regulate such mechanisms. 
The Commission stated that the Report was being disseminated “in order to 
stress that the U.S. federal securities law may apply to various activities, 
including distributed ledger technology, depending on the particular facts 
and circumstances, without regard to the form of the organization or 
technology used to effectuate a particular offer or sale.”161 Note that, in this 
statement, the Commission did not definitively state that “securities laws do 
apply” to cryptocurrency. Nor does this announced purpose of the Report 
definitively indicate that Congress gave the Commission the authority to 
regulate distributed ledger technology at all. Rather, the Commission must 
qualify its purpose by noting that whether securities laws apply 
“depend[s].”162 
But a more deliberate approach—taken by Congress and aided by 
legislative research and hearing testimony—could provide much clearer 
guidance to empowered federal agencies regarding how to regulate 
cryptocurrency. It would also recognize, in accord with the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Gottschalk, that there are “technological problems” for which 
“considered action by the Congress is needed.”163 Congress is uniquely 
suited to address cryptocurrency regulation because of its “broad powers of 
investigation” that would allow it to “canvass the wide variety of views 
which those operating in this field entertain.”164 This consideration would 
allow empowered federal agencies—whether Congress decides to empower 
                                                                                                                     
160 July 2017 SEC Report of Investigation, supra note 12, at 1–2. 
161 Id. at 10 (emphasis added). 
162 Id. at 10; see also Terzo, supra note 133 (noting that in a Congressional hearing, SEC Chairman 
Jay Clayton described cryptocurrency as a “complicated area”). 
163 Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 73 (1972). 
164 Id. 
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the SEC or a new federal agency or sub-agency as this Note proposes—to 
confidently proceed into this area of regulation with the proper foundation 
to fulfill the important function of preventing the use of cryptocurrency for 
improper ends. When the SEC produces warnings and guidance in an area 
of such importance without clear congressional guidance, it runs the risk of 
losing legitimacy. As cryptocurrency technology develops, it exposes holes 
in the SEC’s guidance that would better be filled through Congress’s 
unequivocal statement about which agency should move forward into the 
area of cryptocurrency. 
With cryptocurrency becoming such a major, developing asset to the 
U.S. economy, it should be viewed alongside regulatory subjects like 
tobacco, telecommunications rate-filing requirements, and technological 
developments in software. Notably, the Supreme Court has resisted federal 
agency regulation of all of these subjects absent clear statutory authority 
from Congress.165 Cryptocurrency should be no different. The SEC should 
not be able to infer that it has the authority to regulate such a major issue 
when no statute explicitly gives the Commission such authority. In addition, 
judges should refrain from issuing rulings that allow the SEC to take such 
authority, as such holdings fly in the face of the Separation of Powers, which 
directs the Congress in conjunction with the President to make the laws.166  
B. Guarding Against a Piecemeal Approach to Cryptocurrency Regulation 
Allowing federal agencies to regulate cryptocurrency without clear 
statutory authority could lead to a piecemeal approach to cryptocurrency 
regulation that does not fully account for all of its uses. Of course, the 
cryptocurrency industry would not be the first field to be regulated by 
multiple agencies. For example, agencies that regulate the food industry 
include the Food and Drug Administration, Food Safety Inspection Service, 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Environmental Protection 
Agency, United States Department of Agriculture, Federal Trade 
Commission, Department of Commerce, and Department of Labor, among 
other state and federal regulatory bodies.167 Any multifaceted industry will 
be subject to a variety of regulators. This Section does not argue that any 
company or industry that engages in the cryptocurrency field should not be 
subject to the various applicable regulators. For example, this Note does not 
                                                                                                                     
165 U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 855 F.3d 381, 420–21 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) 
(citations omitted). 
166 See Fixing Statutory Interpretation, supra note 21, at 2120 (“Article I assigns Congress, along 
with the President, the power to make laws. Article III grants the courts the ‘judicial Power’ to interpret 
those laws in individual ‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies.’ When courts apply doctrines that allow them to 
rewrite the laws (in effect), they are encroaching on the legislature’s Article I power.” (footnotes 
omitted)). 
167 US Agencies Involved with Food Safety, N.D. ST. U., https://www.ndsu.edu/pubweb/~saxowsky/ 
aglawtextbk/chapters/foodlaw/USagencies.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2019). 
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argue that if a major bank creates a cryptocurrency, then that bank should no 
longer have to comply with the various federal banking regulators. Rather, 
this Section argues for single agency regulation—a “one stop shop”—of 
cryptocurrency regulation, specifically. 
A comparison to, for example, the food industry provides a useful 
juxtaposition. The food industry is much more mature than the 
cryptocurrency field. While innovations are constantly taking place, even in 
mature fields like the food industry, food production generally is, of course, 
not a new subject for regulation. Piecemeal regulation does not endanger 
food production, as a whole, in the same way it endangers a new, developing 
technology like cryptocurrency. While companies that take part in the food 
industry may argue that they must deal with too many regulators—and 
smaller companies in that industry might claim that they are 
disproportionately affected by the cost of compliance of engaging the 
multitude of regulators—there is inherently more regulatory clarity for 
mature industries, at least in general. This is the product of mature industries 
having been regulated for so long. Cryptocurrency is different. 
Cryptocurrency is new and developing. Unfortunately, “with little official 
guidance to go on, startups are left to fend for themselves in a sea of self-
declared experts.”168 
While securities regulations might practically be used for some 
cryptocurrency regulation, securities laws are not applicable to all forms of 
cryptocurrency.169 This point is illustrated by the striking differences 
between JPM Coin and the cryptocurrencies at issue in Zaslavskiy.170 On the 
one hand, Zaslavskiy allegedly defrauded investors through 
misrepresentations that his coins were “backed by investments in real estate 
and diamonds” when, in fact, they were not.171 Furthermore, Zaslavskiy 
staged an initial coin offering and lied to investors about both how much he 
had raised and a supposed “team of lawyers, professionals, brokers, and 
accountants.”172 On the other hand, J.P. Morgan—a vast and established 
institution173—is promoting a form of cryptocurrency that is “redeemable in 
                                                                                                                     
168 Mendelson, supra note 14, at 52. 
169 See Hughes & Middlebrook, supra note 129, at 528–29 (“[A]lthough it is highly desirable for 
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to continue to regulate and supervise those who would 
offer securities based on cryptocurrencies, . . . any role played by securities regulators, including the 
SEC, would not resolve all of the issues involved with the use of cryptocurrencies in payment 
transactions.” (footnote omitted)). 
170 See Zaslavskiy Memorandum & Order, supra note 3, at *2–3 (discussing the defendant’s alleged 
fraudulent scheme involving cryptocurrencies). 
171 SEC Exposes Two Initial Coin Offerings Purportedly Backed by Real Estate and Diamonds, 
U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMM’N (Sept. 29, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2017-185-0 
[hereinafter SEC Zaslavskiy Press Release]. 
172 Id. 
173 Son, supra note 119 (“The lender moves more than $6 trillion around the world every day for 
corporations in its massive wholesale payments business.”). 
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fiat currency held by J.P. Morgan” and corresponds in value with the U.S. 
dollar.174 To reiterate, JPM Coin will reportedly be used for purposes 
including “international payments for large corporate clients” and 
“securities transactions,” as well as “for huge corporations that use J.P. 
Morgan’s treasury services business to replace the dollars they hold in 
subsidiaries across the world.”175 These differences between JPM Coin and 
the Zaslavskiy cryptocurrencies raise the question of whether 
cryptocurrencies that are so different can be sensibly regulated in the same 
way. Furthermore, if the answer is no, how should the regulatory structures 
for different types of cryptocurrency be constructed? 
J.P. Morgan provides some insights regarding the complexity of these 
regulatory questions. In announcing its new cryptocurrency, the bank touts 
the fact that it is “a nationally chartered U.S. bank” that “must comply with 
banking laws and regulations.”176 J.P. Morgan further touts that it is 
“supervised by banking regulators in the United States and in the 
international jurisdictions in which it operates.”177 According to the bank, 
this “[r]egulatory [o]versight,” combined with other factors such as its 
“expertise in blockchain,” allow it to “seamlessly and securely transfer and 
settle money for clients around the world.”178 J.P. Morgan is wise to tout this 
regulatory structure, as it helps to portray JPM Coin as less risky than other 
cryptocurrencies.179 As to the question of whether regulators support JPM 
Coin, J.P. Morgan responds, “JPM Coin is currently a prototype. As we 
move towards production we will actively engage our regulators to explain 
its design and solicit their feedback and any necessary approvals.”180 With 
this in mind, the following questions remain: Should these regulators include 
the SEC? Is JPM Coin truly a security? Should the SEC regulate JPM Coin 
in the same way that it regulated Zaslavskiy’s cryptocurrencies? 
By proposing that courts guard against the piecemeal regulation of 
cryptocurrency, this Note does not intend to allow frauds and other crimes 
involving cryptocurrency to go unregulated. Accordingly, before moving 
any further, this Note will separate Zaslavskiy’s alleged fraud from the 
broader question of the use of securities regulations to regulate 
cryptocurrency. This separation is important to avoid the appearance that by 
                                                                                                                     
174 J.P. Morgan JPM Coin Announcement, supra note 25. 
175 Son, supra note 119. 
176 J.P. Morgan JPM Coin Announcement, supra note 25. 
177 Id. 
178 Id. 
179 See, e.g., Hughes & Middlebrook, supra note 129, at 528 (“Online wallet operators and 
exchanges in the cryptocurrency industry do not have comparable regulatory requirements and, as a 
result, their customers are exposed to higher credit and liquidity risks of cryptocurrency wallets and 
exchanges than are customers of traditional money service businesses or money transmitters or 
depository institutions.”). 
180 J.P. Morgan JPM Coin Announcement, supra note 25. 
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refusing to classify cryptocurrency as a security, courts would allow alleged 
fraudsters like Zaslavskiy to avoid accountability for their actions. A finding 
that cryptocurrency does not fall within the definition of a security would 
not have left the state and federal governments without a remedy through 
which it could have prosecuted Zaslavskiy for his fraud—a fraud that it 
seems clear he committed if the allegations against him are true.181 For 
example, as long as such a fraud involved interstate wire transmittals or the 
mail, the Federal Government likely could have prosecuted Zaslavskiy for 
wire fraud182 or mail fraud.183 This means that, under such circumstances, 
the Federal Government could have charged Zaslavskiy with or without the 
SEC and with or without relying on a court to define his cryptocurrencies as 
securities. Note that the mail fraud statute includes using the mail in 
connection with fraudulently “sell[ing]” and “exchang[ing] . . . any 
counterfeit or spurious coin, obligation, security, or other article.”184 
Zaslavskiy’s cryptocurrencies could have fallen within such language, 
which includes securities, but covers a far more expansive landscape than 
just securities. These general fraud statutes would have been the proper 
avenue for prosecution in such a case lacking clarity as to whether 
cryptocurrencies are securities. In contrast to these more general fraud 
statutes, the Supreme Court has noted “that Congress, in enacting the 
securities laws, did not intend to provide a broad federal remedy for all 
fraud.”185 But, by defining Zaslavskiy’s cryptocurrencies as securities, the 
Federal Government gained access to more prosecutorial tools. By way of 
                                                                                                                     
181 See McClellan v. Cantrell, 217 F.3d 890, 893 (7th Cir. 2000) (“Fraud is a generic term, which 
embraces all the multifarious means which human ingenuity can devise and which are resorted to by one 
individual to gain an advantage over another by false suggestions or by the suppression of truth. No 
definite and invariable rule can be laid down as a general proposition defining fraud, and it includes all 
surprise, trick, cunning, dissembling, and any unfair way by which another is cheated.” (citing Stapleton 
v. Holt, 250 P.2d 451, 453–54 (Okla. 1952))). 
182 See 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2012) (“Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or 
artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, 
representations, or promises, transmits or causes to be transmitted by means of wire, radio, or television 
communication in interstate or foreign commerce, any writings, signs, signals, pictures, or sounds for the 
purpose of executing such scheme or artifice, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 
20 years, or both.”). 
183 See id. § 1341 (prescribing punishment for “[w]hoever, having devised or intending to devise 
any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent 
pretenses, representations, or promises, or to sell, dispose of, loan, exchange, alter, give away, distribute, 
supply, or furnish or procure for unlawful use any counterfeit or spurious coin, obligation, security, or 
other article, or anything represented to be or intimated or held out to be such counterfeit or spurious 
article, for the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice or attempting so to do, places in any post 
office or authorized depository for mail matter, any matter or thing whatever to be sent or delivered by 
the Postal Service” (emphasis added)). 
184 Id. 
185 Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 556 (1982) (citations omitted). 
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the SEC, the Federal Government also charged Zaslavskiy with violating the 
“registration provisions of the federal securities laws.”186   
If Zaslavskiy’s cryptocurrencies should have been filed as securities, it 
is important to ask whether that means that all cryptocurrencies, including 
JPM Coin, should be registered as securities. For purposes of this Note’s 
analysis, it is helpful to first hypothetically attempt to bring a 
cryptocurrency, like JPM Coin, under the purview of securities laws in the 
same way that the Federal Government brought Zaslavskiy’s 
cryptocurrencies under such regulation: by defining the cryptocurrency as 
an investment contract. Such an analysis seems appropriate because this is 
the only way that the Federal Government has, thus far, been able to subject 
cryptocurrency to securities laws. This Note argues that it would be difficult 
for the Federal Government, under such an analysis, to successfully define 
JPM Coin as a security. As this Note previously stated, the three 
requirements for an “investment contract” under the Howey test are: (1) an 
investment of money (2) in a “common enterprise” in which someone (3) “is 
led to expect profits solely from the efforts of the promoter or third party.”187 
Without even examining the first two requirements, it appears as though the 
Federal Government would fail on the third prong of the Howey test alone. 
If JPM Coin is simply being used for instant transactions, it seems clear that 
those who use it are not being “led to expect profits solely from the efforts 
of . . . [a] third party.”188 From this standpoint, it seems as though the 
following is true: the Zaslavskiy cryptocurrencies may have been deemed 
securities by way of their characterization as investment contracts; but, the 
closest association that JPM Coin should have to the securities regulatory 
scheme is that one of its key purposes will reportedly be “instant 
settlements” in “securities transactions.”189 
Some might submit that the distinguishing factor between the Zaslavskiy 
cryptocurrencies and JPM Coin is so simple that proposing that regulators 
might try to classify JPM Coin as an investment contract is simply setting 
up a strawman argument that can be easily struck down. The obvious 
distinction is that the Zaslavskiy cryptocurrencies involved an initial coin 
offering that was used to raise capital,190 while JPM Coin presumably will 
not. In fact, it may seem that JPM Coin is so different from Zaslavskiy-like 
cryptocurrencies that JPM Coin can easily be viewed as a payment system, 
and as a result, there is no reason to grapple over whether it is a security. In 
this sense, JPM Coin would seem more like the Automated Clearing House 
                                                                                                                     
186 SEC Zaslavskiy Press Release, supra note 171. 
187 Zaslavskiy Memorandum & Order, supra note 3, at *9 (internal citation omitted); see supra Part 
I (describing the Howey test as applied in the Zaslavskiy case). 
188 Zaslavskiy Memorandum & Order, supra note 3, at *9. 
189 Son, supra note 119. 
190 SEC Zaslavskiy Press Release, supra note 171. 
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(ACH) system, which clears and settles electronic fund transfers.191 Or, it 
may seem more like the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial 
Telecommunications (SWIFT), through which “advice or an instruction for 
a bank to transfer funds from one account to another” can be sent.192 
Therefore, one might observe that the Zaslavskiy cryptocurrencies fall neatly 
within the purview of securities regulation, while JPM Coin falls wholly 
without.193 At first, this observation seems to be a useful tool to aid in the 
argument that federal regulators need no more guidance from Congress in 
order to proceed with regulating cryptocurrency. Proponents of this view 
might argue that Congress so clearly intended for Zaslavskiy 
cryptocurrencies—and not JPM Coin—to be subject to securities regulation, 
that looking to Congress for more explicit authorization regarding how to 
regulate cryptocurrency is wasting time on procedure for the sake of 
procedure.   
One might further submit that it is plain to see that JPM Coin should not 
fall under the purview of securities regulations because it is much more like 
an actual form of currency or fiat money than it is a security. J.P. Morgan is 
not merely holding investors’ money and promising return on their 
investments in cryptocurrency. Rather, as the bank describes, “[w]hen one 
client sends money to another over the blockchain, JPM Coins are 
transferred and instantaneously redeemed for the equivalent amount of U.S. 
dollars.”194 Thus, some might argue that when JPM Coin is placed before 
any judge, it will be easy for the judge to decide that it is definitively not a 
security. 
But careful attention to Judge Dearie’s memorandum and order in 
Zaslavskiy undermines this argument. There, the court acknowledged—and 
swiftly dismissed—the defendant’s “glib[]” argument that investors did not 
invest money because they “exchange[d]” “one medium of currency for 
another.”195 Judge Dearie noted that the “Indictment alleges that investors 
gave up money—or other assets—in exchange for ‘membership’ in [the 
                                                                                                                     
191 Don Coker, Banking Industry Standards and Practices for Funds Wire Transfers by Fed Wire, 
CHIPS, SWIFT, ACH, and EFT, HGEXPERTS.COM, https://www.hgexperts.com/expert-witness-
articles/banking-industry-standards-and-practices-for-funds-wire-transfers-by-fed-wire-chips-swift-
ach-and-eft-20495 (last visited Oct. 2, 2019). 
192 Id. As a preliminary matter, these comparisons to cryptocurrency are not entirely warranted, as 
cryptocurrency differs from both the SWIFT and ACH systems because those systems are not 
traditionally based on blockchain technology. See id. (describing the SWIFT and ACH systems). 
193 See Terzo, supra note 133 (“Bitcoin, [SEC] Chairman Clayton said, has ‘been determined by 
most people to not be a security.’ Tokens used to finance projects, such as tokens that are issued in the 
fundraising process of an ICO, however, are different. ‘There are none that I’ve seen that aren’t 
securities,’ said Clayton,” [sic] adding: ‘To the extent something is a security, we should regulate it as a 
security.’”). 
194 J.P. Morgan JPM Coin Announcement, supra note 25. 
195 Zaslavskiy Memorandum & Order, supra note 3, at *11 (quoting defendant’s motion to dismiss). 
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defendant’s] ventures.”196 With this precedent on the record, it is uncertain 
whether judges will be apt to simply recognize a cryptocurrency as akin to a 
currency and dismiss its status as a potential security. 
Importantly, to make either of the arguments in the last two paragraphs 
for classifying Zaslavskiy’s cryptocurrency as a security—and J.P. 
Morgan’s cryptocurrency as something else—defeats another potential 
non-textualist argument that this Note acknowledged when it first discussed 
“procedure for the sake of procedure.”197 That argument was that it would 
be a waste of time to ask Congress to add the word “cryptocurrency” to the 
definitions for securities in the Exchange Act and the Securities Act because 
it goes without saying that the definitions already provide the authority to 
regulate cryptocurrencies as securities.198 Simply put, drawing a line 
between Zaslavskiy’s cryptocurrencies and JPM Coin in order to distinguish 
what is a security and what is not acknowledges that the SEC does not have 
blanket authority to regulate cryptocurrencies. After all, both tokens are 
cryptocurrencies, and such a distinction would place one of them outside the 
purview of securities regulations. 
In short, the SEC’s role in cryptocurrency regulation post-Zaslavskiy 
could go either of two ways—but both are undesirable. The first possibility 
is that the SEC will not claim jurisdiction over all cryptocurrencies because 
it will concede that it does not have clear authority to do so. This would leave 
cryptocurrency innovators with the question of whether their specific 
cryptocurrency obliges them to follow the SEC’s requirements, including 
those on registration. The second possibility is that the SEC will claim 
jurisdiction over all cryptocurrency. In this case, the Commission would be 
regulating cryptocurrencies that do not appropriately fit under its authority, 
including cryptocurrencies that do not involve ICOs.199 Either way, 
innovation suffers. 
If Congress were to authorize one agency or sub-agency to deal with 
cryptocurrency regulation, that regulatory body could appropriately deal 
with the full spectrum of cryptocurrencies—from those like JPM Coin, 
which look like fiat currency, to those like Zaslavskiy’s cryptocurrencies, 
which looked much more like securities. With such a system in place, 
                                                                                                                     
196 Id. 
197 See supra Part III. 
198 Id. 
199 But, even distinguishing cryptocurrencies involving ICOs from other cryptocurrencies would 
not necessarily resolve the issue of determining the proper place for SEC regulation, as there is room for 
disagreement regarding whether all ICO-related cryptocurrencies are securities. See Diego Zuluaga, 
Should Cryptocurrencies Be Regulated Like Securities?, CATO INST. BRIEFING PAPER, June 25, 2018, at 
3, https://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/cmfa-briefing-paper-1-updated.pdf (“[S]ome ICOs 
may qualify as securities under certain circumstances.” (emphasis added)); see also Clayton, supra note 
4 (“A key question for all ICO market participants: ‘Is the coin or token a security?’ As securities law 
practitioners know well, the answer depends on the facts.”). 
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Congress could direct the regulatory body to conduct analyses that properly 
address these two types of cryptocurrencies and those that fall in the gray 
area in between. It would not be out of the ordinary for Congress to direct 
such analyses.200 In accord with this Note’s argument describing 
cryptocurrency as a major question,201 the role of Congress is important in 
avoiding piecemeal regulation because cryptocurrency raises “problems . . . 
which only committees of Congress can manage, for broad powers of 
investigation are needed.”202 Such problems would be best dealt with by 
Congress and an agency it specifically authorizes. 
A full discussion of exactly which agency should house a potential 
cryptocurrency sub-agency is beyond the scope of this Note. However, the 
missions and characteristics of certain currently-existing federal agencies 
offer some guidance. First, while the SEC is not currently positioned to 
adequately address cryptocurrency, with clear congressional guidance, the 
SEC might ultimately be the best agency to house a cryptocurrency 
sub-agency. The SEC’s mission is “to protect investors; maintain fair, 
orderly, and efficient markets; and facilitate capital formation.”203 As such, 
the SEC could provide some expertise in the areas of: (a) cryptocurrencies 
that involve capital raising; and (b) the markets in which cryptocurrencies 
are exchanged. However, adequately equipping the SEC to deal with 
cryptocurrency would involve expanding its authority within the new 
sub-agency so that it can address and adapt to non-capital raising 
cryptocurrencies that currently exist or are yet to be developed. 
The Federal Trade Commission might serve as an even better host to a 
new cryptocurrency sub-agency due to its more general mission. The FTC 
seeks to “[p]rotect[] consumers and competition by preventing 
anticompetitive, deceptive, and unfair business practices through law 
enforcement, advocacy, and education without unduly burdening legitimate 
business activity.”204 As the Zaslavskiy case demonstrates, there are 
                                                                                                                     
200 See, e.g., OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, OFFICE OF INFO. & REGULATORY AFFAIRS, 2017 DRAFT 
REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS AND AGENCY 
COMPLIANCE WITH THE UNFUNDED MANDATES REFORM ACT 1 n.2 (2017), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/draft_2017_cost_benefit_report.pdf (“Under 
the [Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996], agencies submit a report to each 
House of Congress and GAO and make available ‘a complete copy of the cost-benefit analysis of the 
rule, if any.’” (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 801(a)(1)(B)(i) (2012))). 
201 See supra Section III.A. 
202 Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 73 (1972); see also Harper, supra note 154 (“The crypto 
industry won’t have a firm standard for what conduct is allowed and what’s illegal until Congress passes 
new legislation or the SEC’s theories are tested in court.” (quoting Jake Chervinsky, an attorney at Kobre 
& Kim law firm)). 
203 About the SEC, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/about.shtml (last visited 
Oct. 2, 2019). 
204 About the FTC, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc (last visited Oct. 2, 2019). 
See also What to Know About Cryptocurrency, FED. TRADE COMM’N CONSUMER INFO. (Oct. 2018), 
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certainly “deceptive” and “unfair” business practices to be addressed in the 
world of cryptocurrency.205 But, as a broader concept, these issues 
presumably do not all involve the types of cryptocurrencies that look like 
securities. As such, the FTC might be better equipped than the SEC to deal 
with the broad range of fraud and abuse that can occur in the developing 
field of cryptocurrency. On the other hand, the FTC presents the question of 
whether the Federal Government will want to view all of those who purchase 
cryptocurrencies as simply “consumers” rather than “investors.” 
As this overview of the SEC and the FTC illustrates, there may not exist 
any perfect host for a new cryptocurrency sub-agency. As such, Congress 
may find it best to create a separate, freestanding commission to deal with 
cryptocurrency. But regardless of whether Congress decides to modify the 
authority of a currently-existing federal agency through the formation of a 
sub-agency or to create a new federal commission altogether, either option 
would be preferable to the current state of affairs. Appropriate, clear 
congressional guidance would lead to the formation of a body that is 
adequately equipped to deal with the full range of cryptocurrency 
innovations as they develop. 
C. The Disproportionate Effect of Uncertainty in Regulation on Smaller 
Cryptocurrency Innovators 
Many will argue that some cryptocurrency regulation—even if 
piecemeal—is better than no regulation. This Note does not dispute that 
point. For example, protecting Americans from fraudsters and investor 
scams, such as the fraud alleged in Zaslavskiy, is an important role of the 
Federal Government. That role should not be disregarded in a specific case 
simply because cryptocurrency is involved. Whether or not fraudsters should 
be prosecuted is not a close question. But, upon deeper inspection, the 
relevant questions become much closer. One close question is whether 
cryptocurrency fraudsters should be charged with securities fraud or under 
some other anti-fraud provision. Put another way, should the Federal 
Government be afforded an additional ground for federal jurisdiction 
through the anti-securities fraud statutory remedy? Or, as an alternative, 
should the Federal Government have to rely on other more general anti-fraud 
statutes or simply concede that some fraud fighting should be left to the 
States? An even closer question involves whether, setting aside this 
discussion of fraud altogether, cryptocurrencies should have to be registered 
as securities—and if so, which cryptocurrencies should have to be 
registered? 
                                                                                                                     
https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/what-know-about-cryptocurrency (providing information to 
consumers about cryptocurrency and cryptocurrency scams). 
205 See supra Part I for a discussion of Zaslavskiy. 
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The fact is that the answers to the questions noted above are not clear. 
Rather, due to the SEC’s own lack of specification, it is “impossible to tell 
which” cryptocurrencies the SEC considers to be securities and which ones 
it does not.206 A negative consequence of the lack of clarity regarding these 
questions is that action can be brought against individuals and 
cryptocurrency corporations for failing to register a cryptocurrency with the 
SEC, even though there was no clear notice that such a cryptocurrency 
should have been registered in the first place.207 This lack of notice leads to 
injustice. Moreover, the development of cryptocurrency as an asset to our 
society can be stifled through this lack of clarity.208 One corporation has 
already blamed the “ever changing regulatory landscape of the 
cryptocurrency space” as the reason that it shut down.209 
But, importantly, all corporations are not affected equally by uncertainty 
in regulation. Smaller companies, like the aforementioned company that 
claimed that it shut down due to constantly changing regulations,210 can 
withstand much less regulatory scrutiny and fewer penalties than larger 
corporations, like J.P. Morgan. In that connection, smaller cryptocurrency 
companies can afford to take on less risk than larger companies. With its 
vast resources, J.P. Morgan is much more likely to be able to “actively 
engage [its] regulators to explain its [cryptocurrency’s] design and solicit 
their feedback and any necessary approvals,”211 than a smaller company. 
Consequently, as regulatory uncertainty persists, smaller companies will be 
less likely to innovate and thereby take the chance that the SEC or some 
other agency will sanction them for an infraction as simple as failing to 
register their cryptocurrency as a security. 
The idea that smaller corporations can be at a disadvantage in the area 
of innovation is not a novel one. In general, economists worry that smaller 
companies are not enjoying the rewards of innovation that larger companies 
                                                                                                                     
206 Michaels, supra note 1. 
207 See, e.g., Solias v. Latium Network, Inc., No. 18-10255 (SDW) (SCM), 2018 WL 6445543, at 
*6 (D.N.J. Dec. 10, 2018) (“[T]his Court concludes that Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that LATX 
tokens are investment contracts under the Howey test. Because the LATX were never registered with the 
Securities and Exchange Commission, Plaintiff may maintain a cause of action against Latium . . . .” 
(internal citations omitted)). 
208 See Zuluaga, supra note 199, at 1 (“Regulatory uncertainty is chilling innovation and increasing 
volatility in cryptocurrency markets.”); see also Kaushal & Tyle, supra note 136 (“Disruptive 
technologies rarely fit neatly into existing regulatory considerations, but rigid regulatory frameworks 
have repeatedly stifled innovation. It’s likely that innovations in the Blockchain will outpace policy, let’s 
not slow it down.”); Alex Sunnarborg, The Incoming Wave of ICO Regulation (Yes, It’s Coming), 
COINDESK (Nov. 2, 2018, 8:00 UTC), https://www.coindesk.com/the-incoming-wave-of-ico-regulation-
yes-its-coming (last updated Nov. 3, 2018) (“Aside from the uncertain regulatory risk, an ICO is nearly 
a no-brainer for capital hungry entrepreneurs.”). 
209 Michaels, supra note 1. 
210 Id. 
211 J.P. Morgan JPM Coin Announcement, supra note 25. 
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enjoy.212 Unfortunately, “globalization and new technology [are] delivering 
outsize rewards to the titans of the global economy.”213 Even without the 
adverse effects of unclear regulations, innovations may already be too 
expensive for smaller companies to undertake.214 This general hazard applies 
to the cryptocurrency landscape, where larger corporations can foot the bill 
for innovation, while smaller companies may have to wait for innovations 
to trickle down to them. But even if the “trickle down” were immediate, this 
dilemma creates a secondary issue because smaller corporations may not be 
interested in the innovations of larger corporations at all. For example, a 
small company may not have any use for a fiat-like currency like JPM Coin, 
but it may find great utility in an ICO. The reverse may also be true, as J.P. 
Morgan may have no interest in an ICO that a smaller company would 
utilize. The danger that results is that only innovations that benefit larger 
cryptocurrency corporations will be brought to fruition, while the 
innovations that might benefit smaller companies lag behind. Uncertainty in 
regulation only serves to exacerbate this inequality. 
If cryptocurrency innovators were able to engage one regulator—in the 
form of a single cryptocurrency regulatory body—the problem of inequality 
between smaller and larger companies would be diminished. Rather than 
guessing as to which agencies will regulate their cryptocurrency, the 
companies could look to just one commission for regulatory guidance. Such 
an agency could give those companies confidence as they innovate. For 
example, the body could provide clear regulations depending on the type of 
cryptocurrency the company promotes. Additionally, while innovating, a 
cryptocurrency company could ask the regulator directly whether it would 
take action against the company for taking certain steps. Hypothetically, the 
regulator could then issue a “no-action letter” in order to indicate that the 
company would not be subject to enforcement. The SEC currently issues no-
action letters in response to “individual[s] or entit[ies] who [are] not certain 
whether a particular product, service, or action would constitute a violation 
of federal securities law.”215 While these letters can give confidence to those 
concerned only about an SEC enforcement action, their usefulness is 
lessened when innovators do not know exactly which agencies will be 
regulating them. This is the case with cryptocurrency regulation. Smaller 
companies simply may not have the resources to reach out to multiple 
                                                                                                                     
212 Douglas et al., supra note 132. 
213 Id. 
214 Id. (“By developing the technology itself, [PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP] reaps all the 
productivity gains. Abacus Consulting has access to a similar tool, but it has to pay another software 
company to use it, reducing its productivity gain. Building the software ‘wouldn’t be viable for a small 
business like mine, as the costs would be too high for development and we wouldn’t be able to offer the 
same security as larger providers can,’ says Mr. Pritchard [a manager at Abacus Consultancy].”). 
215 No Action Letters, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/fast-
answers/answersnoactionhtm.html (last modified Mar. 23, 2017). 
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potential regulators and inquire as to their regulatory obligations. The 
consequent inability to move forward with confidence that an unforeseen 
sanction will not force a small company to shut down might lead that 
company to forgo certain avenues of innovation altogether. 
There is a legitimate argument that the proposal in this Note will add an 
agency (or sub-agency) to the Federal Government that is capable of being 
controlled by the lobbyists of large corporations.216 That argument would 
lead to the conclusion that the proposal would not resolve the issue of 
disproportionate impacts on large and small cryptocurrency companies 
because the large corporations would lobby for regulations that benefit them. 
This Note acknowledges this argument and does not dismiss it. However, 
when viewed alongside the alternatives—and the current state of affairs—
an agency committed to getting comprehensive cryptocurrency regulation 
right is superior to a multitude of agencies that claim jurisdiction over the 
subject without sending clear messages to those they regulate. In fact, if 
there is any way that smaller cryptocurrency companies can have their 
voices heard, it would be through Congress or a single accessible regulator 
that has been directed by Congress to account for all of the players in the 
cryptocurrency economy. After all, it is Congress that can conduct “hearings 
which canvass the wide variety of views which those operating in this field 
entertain.”217 As this Note has argued, when cryptocurrency companies must 
engage multiple regulators that might have jurisdiction over them, the 
smallest companies with the least resources are hurt the most and heard the 
least. 
A related counterargument to this Note’s proposal states that if a goal of 
this proposal is to encourage innovation, then initiating a new regulatory 
body to regulate cryptocurrency is counterintuitive because it will lead to 
more regulation, which actually holds back innovation.218 This, too, is a 
legitimate argument. However, what is worse for innovation than a “rigid 
regulatory framework[]”219 is an amorphous, uncertain regulatory 
framework. Under the latter, companies and individuals are left with options 
that include (1) taking their chances and assuming massive risk as they guess 
which agencies might regulate them; (2) hedging against regulatory sanction 
by engaging as many government entities as possible; and (3) forgoing the 
risk of innovation altogether. Large cryptocurrency entities may have the 
                                                                                                                     
216 See Tim Carney, Big Business and Big Government, CATO INST. (July 1, 2006), 
https://www.cato.org/policy-report/julyaugust-2006/big-business-big-government (“[F]or the past 
century and more big business has often relied on big government for support.”). 
217 Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 73 (1972). 
218 See Kaushal & Tyle, supra note 136 (“Had we over-regulated the Internet early on, we would 
have missed out on many innovations that we can’t imagine living without today. The same is true for 
the Blockchain. Disruptive technologies rarely fit neatly into existing regulatory considerations, but rigid 
regulatory frameworks have repeatedly stifled innovation. It’s likely that innovations in the Blockchain 
will outpace policy, let’s not slow it down.”). 
219 Id. 
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resources to choose options (1) or (2), while smaller entities are much more 
likely to have to choose option (3). The Federal Government of the United 
States should strive for a better regulatory framework than this system, in 
which innovators must decide whether the uncertainty in regulation creates 
a risk too great to bear. 
CONCLUSION 
The SEC has been successful in convincing at least one judge at the 
federal district court level that cryptocurrencies can qualify as securities. 
Yet, Congress has not provided explicit guidance regarding how 
cryptocurrency should be classified, which agencies should regulate it, and 
what types of cryptocurrencies each agency should oversee. New uses for 
blockchain technology continue to be developed without firm guidance 
regarding whether these new cryptocurrencies need to be registered as 
securities. When the next use of blockchain technology is invented, it is 
unclear where it will fall on the continuum that contains at one end a 
supposed warrant for securities regulations (i.e. cryptocurrencies involving 
ICOs, such as Zaslavskiy’s cryptocurrencies) and on the other end perhaps 
no warrant for SEC regulation at all (i.e. fiat-like cryptocurrencies, such as 
JPM Coin). It is also unclear whether the SEC will be able to charge whoever 
puts this new cryptocurrency into use with “violations of the . . . registration 
provisions of the federal securities laws”220 if they have not registered the 
cryptocurrency with the Commission. This Note has argued that the SEC 
needs firmer statutory ground to stand on before it can subject anyone to 
such liability. This Note has further argued that a new federal agency or 
sub-agency that specifically deals with cryptocurrency would best address 
the complex issues that cryptocurrency regulation presents. Rather than 
allowing piecemeal regulation through agencies acting without clear 
congressional authorization, such a solution would provide a focused “one 
stop shop” for cryptocurrency innovators that is capable of adapting to meet 
the regulatory needs of cryptocurrency development. 
 
                                                                                                                     
220 SEC Zaslavskiy Press Release, supra note 171. 
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